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ABSTRACT

This dissertation explores conflicts between religion and medicine, cases in which
cultural and religious beliefs motivate requests for inappropriate treatment or the
cessation of treatment, requests that violate the standard of care. I call such requests Mrequests (miracle or martyr requests). I argue that current approaches fail to accord
proper respect to patients who make such requests. Sometimes they are too permissive,
honoring M-requests when they should not; other times they are too strict.
I propose a phronesis-based approach to decide whether to honor an M-request or
whether religious beliefs are medically valid. This approach is culturally sensitive, takes
religious beliefs seriously, and holds them to a high ethical standard. This approach uses
a principle of belief evaluation developed by Linda Zagzebski: The Principle of Rational
Belief, which is founded upon Aristotelian virtue ethics. In addition to the Principle, I
propose a concrete set of conditions to assist caregivers in clinical case evaluations.
In the final chapters, I apply the phronesis-based approach to well-known adult
cases such as the refusal of blood transfusions by Jehovah‟s Witnesses and requests for
continued (futile) care by Orthodox Jews at the end of life. Also, I consider cases
involving children such as African female circumcision and cases of faith healing. I
argue that The Principle of Rational Belief should define the threshold of the kinds of Mrequests for children that can be honored, but I allow a lower threshold for M-requests
made by competent adult patients.
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CHAPTER ONE
Introducing M-Requests1
In the hospital, patients and their families, who come from diverse cultural
backgrounds, bring with them their religious beliefs. This is how it should be. The
religious beliefs of patients give them great comfort and support, but religious beliefs can
also influence their decision-making, which may become a problem if their choices
violate the standard of care. I will call such choices M-requests (miracle or martyr
requests): requests for inappropriate treatment or the inappropriate cessation of treatment
based on religious beliefs.
In the Journal of Medical Ethics, Michael Wreen argues that the religious beliefs
of patients and their families deserve respect. Here he explains how religion serves an
important function in our lives:
Religion has to do with (i) describing and explaining the human condition at its
most fundamental level; (ii) providing a person with a unique concept of personal
identity, in the fullest sense of the term; and (iii) making sense of ourselves and
the world around us in a complete and satisfying way. One of the primary pieces
of the business of religion, in short, is to give a sense to the expression „the
meaning of life‟. It reconciles us, at a deep existential level, to ourselves, to our
world, to each other, and most of all to our limitations and relative importance.
Religious beliefs and values are therefore not on a par with other beliefs and
values a rational person might have, such as ones regarding red objects, however
dear to a person‟s heart such beliefs and values may be…Not to respect an
autonomous person‟s refusal of treatment when that refusal is religiously based is
not to respect him as a person at the deepest level.2
Wreen thinks that M-requests should have special standing, that they should be given
more consideration than “inappropriate” requests based on patients‟ idiosyncratic
1

Parts of this chapter appear in an earlier form in Gregory L. Bock, “Medically Valid Religious Beliefs,”
Journal of Medical Ethics 34 (2008) 437-440.
2
Michael J. Wreen, “Autonomy, Religious Values, and Refusal of Lifesaving Medical Treatment,” Journal
of Medical Ethics 17 (1991) 128.
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choices. Robert Orr and Leigh Genesen defend this point of view in a later article in the
same journal.3
In response, Julian Savulescu argues that such a point of view is discriminatory
against atheists because requests motivated by religion are given preferential treatment.4
In reply to Savulescu, Orr and Genesen modify their definition of “religion” to include
atheism and other non-traditional worldviews.5 I do not have the space here to explore
whether atheism serves the same purposes that traditional religious views do, but I will
define “religious belief” broadly, including the beliefs of any worldview that fulfill the
functions Wreen describes.
The religious beliefs of patients and families deserve respect, and M-requests
should be given special consideration. However, not all such requests should be honored
because many of them are morally disturbing, such as when parents prevent their children
from getting urgent medical care. Nevertheless, the problem is in drawing the line, in
deciding whether M-requests are medically valid.
In this dissertation, I propose a phronesis-based approach for deciding when to
honor M-requests. This approach, I argue, is culturally sensitive and holds M-requests to
a high moral standard.

3

Robert D. Orr and Leigh B Genesen, “Requests for „Inappropriate‟ Treatment Based on Religious
Beliefs,” Journal of Medical Ethics 23 (1997)142-147.
4
Julian Savulescu, “Two Worlds Apart: Religion and Ethics.” Journal of Medical Ethics 24 (1993) 382.
Savulescu also makes the stronger claim that religious beliefs are less rational than others (implication: they
have less standing). Religious requests, he claims, are based on irrational beliefs that are probably false.
Ethics, on the other hand, is reasonable and factual. In later chapters, I show that religious beliefs can be
rational, but aside from these considerations, I think Michael Wreen (1991) makes a solid argument that
religions are special and worthy of consideration; see also Huston Smith, Why Religion Matters: the Fate of
the Human Spirit in an Age of Disbelief (New York: HarperCollins, 2001).
5
Robert D. Orr and Leigh B Genesen, “Medicine, Ethics and Religion: Rational or Irrational?” Journal of
Medical Ethics 24 (1998) 385-387.
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In chapter two, I examine religious beliefs and M-requests in the following four
cases: (1) Jehovah‟s Witnesses and the refusal of blood transfusions, (2) African female
circumcision, (3) Orthodox Judaism and end-of-life care, and (4) faith healing. I explore
how religious beliefs are justified in these cases and communities, how the physical body
and medicine are viewed from their perspectives, and what virtues they promote. For
each, I explain the cultural background and beliefs involved. All four cases reappear for
discussion in subsequent chapters.
In chapter three, I briefly explore the philosophical basis of the liberty of
conscience and its limits when it comes to healthcare. Second, I examine the standard of
care as described in the medical literature. Third, I consider some approaches to handling
M-requests and argue that they are either ineffective or insensitive to patients‟ religious
beliefs, being either too permissive or too strict. They inappropriately allow or deny Mrequests at different times. Sometimes the standard of care overrides an M-request
without giving it sufficient consideration; other times, M-requests trump the standard of
care in the name of patient autonomy and religious tolerance. In both cases, decisions are
made without adequately engaging the patient‟s beliefs. True respect requires taking
beliefs seriously, which means that caregivers should attempt to understand the patient‟s
point of view and subject the beliefs to standards that govern all other discourse in the
public square: standards of reason.
In chapter four, I propose a phronesis-based approach which uses a principle of
belief evaluation created by Linda Zagzebski. She calls the principle the Principle of
Rational Belief (PRB) and develops it from Aristotelian virtue ethics, in which the
3

phronimos (the virtuous person) is the standard against which belief-formation can be
judged. In addition, I provide an analysis of some intellectual virtues such as the love of
knowledge, firmness, and humility. Finally, I propose a set of conditions that can be
employed in clinical case consultations.
In chapter five, I apply the approach to some of the cases from chapter two: (1)
Jehovah‟s Witnesses and the refusal of blood transfusions and (2) Orthodox Judaism and
end-of-life care. I conclude that when the patients in these cases are competent adults,
the M-requests should be honored.
In chapter six, I consider Savulescu‟s conditions for deciding M-requests for
children and conclude that his approach is flawed. While his conditions hold M-requests
to a high moral standard, they are culturally insensitive, and I suggest an alternative set of
conditions to remedy this problem. I apply these to pediatric cases involving Jehovah‟s
Witnesses, African female circumcision, and faith healing.

4

CHAPTER TWO
Four Cases
With the diversity of religious beliefs on our planet, there are an untold number of
examples of M-requests. Some M-requests are common while others are peculiar to
individuals. In this dissertation, I have chosen to focus on four relatively common cases,
but the approach I develop can be applied to any M-request. The cases are the following:
(1) the refusal of blood transfusions by Jehovah‟s Witnesses, (2) African female
circumcision, (3) Orthodox Judaism and futile treatment at the end of life, and (4) faith
healing.
Jehovah’s Witnesses and Blood Transfusions
Case: Joy
Joy is a thirteen year old Jehovah‟s Witness (JW) who developed anemia due to a
massive Staphylococcus infection, which affected her blood, bones, and lungs.
With antibiotics, her condition improved, but her physicians now believe they
must intervene surgically to remove the excess pus and scar tissue in her chest
cavity. However, they are unwilling to do so without recourse to a blood
transfusion because Joy‟s anemia makes the procedure very risky. Joy and her
parents have stated that they are against the transfusion, and Joy has clearly and
intelligently articulated her religious beliefs and the JW position on blood in the
absence of her parents. To many, Joy seems to be a mature and competent young
woman.6
Adult JW patients will often refuse blood transfusions even if a transfusion is
medically necessary. It has been estimated that around one thousand Witnesses die each
year because of this.7 In addition, JW parents often refuse medically necessary blood

6

Adapted from Robert Orr and Debra Craig, “Old Enough” Hastings Center Report, (November-December
2007) 15-6.
7
Phil Wilson, “Jehovah‟s Witness Children: When Religion and the Law Collide,” Paediatric Nursing 17
(3) (April 2005) 35.
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transfusions for their children, but current medical practice usually overrules such
refusals, giving a child‟s physical well-being precedence over religious beliefs. In such
cases, the state will often take temporary custody of JW children in order to transfuse
them.
JWs hold a high view of physical life, and they usually seek aggressive medical
treatment for sickness and disease. Nevertheless, they believe that this earthly life is not
the end, and obedience to the God of the Bible is more important. Osamu Muramoto
claims that the following doctrines of the Watchtower (WTS), the organizational body of
Jehovah‟s Witnesses, are important to understanding the teachings about blood:
1) Armageddon is near, in which all mankind will be destroyed except faithful
JWs who will live forever on earth; 2) The WTS governing body is believed to be
the “faithful and discreet slave” referred to in Jesus‟ parable at Matthew 24:45,
divinely appointed by Jesus Christ to lead the JWs; 3) The Bible cannot be
understood without interpretation by the “faithful and discreet slave”; 4) JWs who
openly criticize the leadership and the organization are regarded as apostates,
disloyal to Jesus and God; 5) Salvation is contingent on how well they perform as
loyal JWs.8
JWs believe that they will live forever, either with God or on a new earth, but this future
is contingent on their obedience to God‟s commands in the Bible.
They believe that the Bible prohibits the consumption of blood. This belief is
supported by passages such as the following: “Only you shall not eat flesh with its life,
that is, its blood” (Genesis 9:4, NASV); “You are not to eat any blood, either of bird or
animal, in any of your dwellings. Any person who eats any blood, even that person shall
be cut off from his people” (Leviticus 7:26-27, NASV); “I will set my face against that
person who eats blood and will cut him off from among his people” (Leviticus 17:10,
8

Osamu Muramoto, “Bioethics of the Refusal of Blood by Jehovah‟s Witnesses: Part 1. Should Bioethical
Deliberation Consider Dissidents‟ Views?” Journal of Medical Ethics 24 (1998) 224.
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NASV); “Only be sure not to eat the blood, for the blood is the life, and you shall not eat
the life with the flesh.” (Deuteronomy 12:23, NASV); “For it seemed good to the Holy
Spirit and to us to lay upon you no greater burden than these essentials: that you abstain
from things sacrificed to idols and from blood and from things strangled and from
fornication; if you keep yourselves free from such things, you will do well”9 (Acts 15:2829, NASV); “But concerning the Gentiles who have believed, we wrote, having decided
that they should abstain from meat sacrificed to idols and from blood and from what is
strangled and from fornication” (Acts 21:25, NASV).
The WTS teaches that these ancient biblical commands apply to the modern
practice of blood transfusion as well, at least to whole blood products. This does not,
however, preclude the use of some blood components. In an article that was the standard
statement of JW blood policy for many years, Dixon and Smalley state,
Each Witness must decide individually if he can accept [albumin, immune
globulins, and hemophiliac preparations]…Witnesses believe that blood removed
from the body should be disposed of, so they do not accept autotransfusion of
predeposited blood. Techniques from intraoperative collection or hemodilution
that involve blood storage are objectionable to them. However, many Witnesses
permit the use of dialysis and heart-lung equipment (non-blood-prime) as well as
intraoperative salvage where the extracorporeal circulation is uninterrupted…The
Witnesses do not feel that the Bible comments directly on organ transplants.”10
A more recent article states,
The religious beliefs of Jehovah‟s Witnesses prohibit them from accepting
homologous or autologous blood products, including packed red blood cells,
white blood cells, platelets, and plasma, as a part of even life-saving medical
therapy. Therapies such as albumin, cryoprecipitate, and intraoperative salvage
represent a gray area. Various groups of Jehovah‟s Witnesses hold slightly
9

It is of interest that the consumption of blood is condemned in the same verse that condemns sexual
immorality.
10
J. Lowell Dixon and M. Gene Smalley, “Jehovah‟s Witnesses: The Surgical/Ethical Challenge,” Journal
of American Medical Association 246 (November 27, 1981) 2471-2472.
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different beliefs and, preferably, the use of these therapies needs to be specified
by the individual patient. Fluid replacement with crystalloid and other types of
colloid is generally acceptable as are hemostatic agents such as desmopressin,
recombinant factor VIIa, aprotinin, and epsilon-amniocaproic acid.11
In sum, the WTS teaches that the biblical command concerning blood consumption
applies to blood transfusions. However, this only applies to certain blood products; some
blood components are acceptable.12
JWs believe that blood is symbolic of life and that life is sacred. Although some
critics say that the deeper theological reasoning behind the WTS prohibition of blood
transfusions is unclear,13 some have speculated that it has to do with a concept of spiritual
purity. Richard Singelenberg, for example, explains that in many cultures blood is
essential to group identity and that in Hindu culture blood transfusions are only allowed
among kin in order to preserve the purity of the caste. “Pollution of an individual‟s blood
means a stain on the whole caste.”14 He says that JWs have a similar understanding of
blood:
In the Society‟s blood transfusion doctrine, this consanguinity aspect plays a
partial role. As shown above, the Society often stressed the questionable
characteristics of the donor category, transferring its evil qualities into the
believer‟s bodily system. The analogy with the Indian caste is obvious: reception
meant individual, and accordingly, group pollution. However, a significant flaw
emerges: why is transfusion among Witnesses not allowed? It should be noted
that defection among the Society‟s adherents is considerable… In the view of the
11

May Hua MD, Ronald Munson PhD, Art Lucas, Susan Rovelstad MD, Mary Klingensmith MD, FACS,
and Ira J. Kodner MD, FACS, “Medical Treatment of Jehovah‟s Witnesses,” Surgery 143 (April 2008)
463-465.
12
The Witnesses also give medical reasons for refusing blood transfusions and have documented alleged
risks from using blood products in the manual: Family Care and Medical Management for Jehovah’s
Witnesses (New York: Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of New York, 1992) 4.1-4.13; however, as far
as I can tell, these reasons are secondary to the biblical commands.
13
Ruth Macklin, “The Inner Workings of an Ethics Committee: Latest Battle over Jehovah‟s Witnesses,”
The Hastings Center Report 18 (Feb-Mar., 1988) 15.
14
Richard Singelenberg, “The Blood Transfusion Taboo of Jehovah‟s Witnesses: Origin, Development and
Function of a Controversial Doctrine,” Social Science & Medicine 31 (1990) 520.
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Society, apostate members belong to the realm of Satan. Though the transfusion
might have been life-saving, the thought of a believer who once received blood
from someone who is now in the devil‟s category is almost an obscenity within
the Society‟s ideological schemes. Insiders, thus, can also defile, so an absolute
prohibition is the most secure defense for spiritual pollution.15
While “pollution” may be the reason behind the requests of many JWs, it is not clear that
this is the main reason. For example, some JWs are even against auto-transfusion, in
which a patient‟s own blood is taken out and given back to her. JWs who are against this
believe that once the connection to the body is severed, the blood should be thrown out.16
Before 1960, JWs who accepted a blood transfusion only had to fear the eternal
consequences for accepting a blood transfusion: separation from God (which is no small
consequence). However, that soon changed: “In the „Questions from Readers‟ part in the
15 January, 1961 edition of The Watchtower, it was stated that the taking of a transfusion
would be followed by excommunication (in the Society‟s jargon, „disfellowshipping‟). If
the offender would refuse to acknowledge his transgression or would persist in accepting
or donating blood, he would be considered „a rebellious opposer and unfaithful example
to fellow members‟ and therefore should be cut off from them.”17 The practice of
disfellowshipping has attracted some attention in the Journal of Medical Ethics.
Muramoto claims that current WTS practices amount to coercion and argues that the
WTS could retain the controversial blood doctrine while instituting a don‟t-ask-don‟t-tell
policy that would protect individual privacy and autonomy.18 Donald Ridley, a member
of the WTS, responds:

15

Singelenberg, 520.
Glenn Graber, from personal correspondence.
17
Singelenberg, 517.
18
See Muramoto (1998, 1999, 2000).
16

9

Muramoto essentially advances the anarchic notion that, after freely choosing to
join an organisation because they have come to share or identify themselves with
the organisation‟s basic values or objectives and after agreeing to abide by its
rules and procedures, individuals should nevertheless be free to abandon those
values and objectives and reject the organisation‟s rules and procedures but still
insist that the organisation accept them as full and active members in good
standing. This argument is patently absurd.19
David Malyon, quoting The Watchtower, says, “As free moral agents, each one has
personally decided to live by Bible standards. These are decisions that fall within the
framework of a way of life freely chosen… by potential Witnesses before they ever take
the step of Christian [baptism]”20 Malyon continues: “Never is anyone disfellowshipped
if he or she displays a repentant attitude, and happily a large number of those thus
censured by this rarely used procedure, are eventually restored to our congregations.”21
In spite of Ridley and Malyon‟s defense, Muramoto concerns are still pertinent:
Ridley ignores hundreds of thousands who are members because they were raised
by JW parents and baptised as minors. They were indoctrinated from childhood
into the religion with minimal exposure, if any to critical views. It is sufficient to
point out that the WTS strongly discouraged JW youths from seeking higher
education until 1992, that they are today strongly discouraged from participating
in internet forums, and that JW children are trained to recite their position on
blood to doctors and judges. Where is the free will and full understanding of
doctrine for these next generation JWs?22
Muramoto also provides evidence that the WTS encourages the practice of shunning, the
cutting off of personal ties with apostate friends or family members so that they will

19

Donald T. Ridley, “Jehovah‟s Witnesses‟ Refusal of Blood: Obedience to Scripture and Religious
Conscience” Journal of Medical Ethics 25 (1999) 471.
20
David Malyon, “Transfusion-free Treatment of Jehovah‟s Witnesses: Respecting the Autonomous
Patient‟s Motives,” Journal of Medical Ethics 24 (1998) 377.
21
Malyon, 377.
22
Osamu Muramoto, “Medical Confidentiality and the Protection of Jehovah‟s Witnesses‟ Autonomous
Refusal of Blood,” Journal of Medical Ethics 26 (2000) 383.
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repent.23 This culture of excommunication may not preclude individual autonomy, but it
does seem to hinder it.

African Female Circumcision
Case: Annik
Mr. G brings his 12-year-old daughter, Annik, to Dr. Jordan‟s office with the
request that he [circumcise] her. Although traditionally [in Africa] the procecdure
is performed without anesthesia or antiseptics, Mr. G says that he wants his
daughter to have access to these, because he does not want her to suffer and wants
her to be safe. Dr. Jordan does not find these concessions satisfactory, however.
He believes that the practice, even with anesthesia, reflects an unacceptable
disfigurement, repression, and control of women. Mr. G and his daughter insist
that they want the procedure carried out; if not, they will seek the traditional
method.24

Female circumcision (also known as female genital mutilation or FGM) in Africa,
occurs in twenty-eight countries and affects roughly 132 million women. In Kenya, for
example, “over 50 percent of the population…practices female circumcision, in some
communities the percentage is as high as 90 percent.”25 Traditionally, the procedure is
performed on girls between the ages of four and sixteen by “trained or untrained
midwives, traditional healers, barbers, and occasionally doctors or nurses.”26
There are three types of female circumcision: (1) clitoridectomy, in which all or
part of the clitoris is removed; (2) excision, in which the clitoris and labia minora are

23

Muramoto, “Medical Confidentiality,” 383-4.
From an in-class reflection assignment in Annette Mendola‟s bioethics course at the University of
Tennessee, Fall 2006.
25
Mary Nyangweso Wangila, Female Circumcision: The Interplay of Religion, Culture, and Gender in
Kenya (Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 2007) 8.
26
Rogaia Mustafa Abusharaf, “Introduction: The Custom in Question,” in Female Circumcision:
Multicultural Perspectives, ed. Rogaia Mustafa Abusharaf (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press,
2006) 4.
24
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removed; and (3) infibulation, in which all of the genitalia are removed and the labia
majora is sown mostly shut.
Rogaia Mustafa Abusharaf describes the serious medical risks: “In addition to the
immediate risks of bleeding, shock, and sepsis and the longer-term risks of infertility,
infection, and obstructed labor, there is an increasing concern in medical circles that
unsterilized instruments may be spreading the AIDS virus, particularly when group
circumcisions are performed.”27 Infibulation has some of the most serious complications:
The most common long-term complication was chronic urinary tract infection
caused by the pooling of urine because of tight infibulation…Dysmenorrhoea is
also prevalent; most Somali girls suffer lower abdominal pain during their
monthly period because the very small opening prevents the normal, easy flow of
vaginal secretions and menstrual fluid…In Somaliland and Djibouti, a midwife
often does the de-infibulation at the time of marriage. In southern Somalia and in
the Sudan, the husband is expected to perform this task by penile penetration. The
attempt to deinfibulate the woman in this manner causes great pain, carries a risk
of infection, and causes frustration for the couple. Sometimes the bride becomes
pregnant while still completely infibulated, preventing vaginal exams and prenatal
care and leading to further difficulties at the time of delivery. Many infibulated
women experience prolonged labor at the second stage, which increases the risk
to the mother and may harm the fetus…Medical personnel dealing with
infibulated women indicate that the scarred area obstructs the delivery of the baby
and in many cases severe perineal tears take place even if an anterior episiotomy
is done. Serious complications include vesico-vaginal and recto-vaginal fistulae,
abnormal openings between the vagina and the bladder or the vagina and the
rectum that can cause urinary and fecal incontinence.28
The following reasons are given to justify the practice: (1) social status, (2)
religion, (3) female hyper-sexuality, and (4) marriage.29 First, social status is a concern
because girls who do not get circumcised are often stigmatized and ostracized:

27

Abusharaf, 4.
Raqiya D. Abdalla, “‟My Grandmother Called It the Three Feminine Sorrows‟: The Struggle of Women
Against Female Circumcision in Somalia” in Female Circumcision: Multicultural Perspectives, ed. Rogaia
Mustafa Abusharaf (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006) 191.
29
Mary Nyangweso Wangila, Female Circumcision: The Interplay of Religion, Culture, and Gender in
Kenya (Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 2007) 101.
28
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Female circumcision is viewed by most circumcising communities as an initiation
into womanhood. It ensures female fertility, provides a source of identity, and
prescribes a social status; the lack of circumcision can lead to social exclusion and
shunning. Circumcision is perceived as a test of courage in preparation for the
pain of childbirth, a sign of maturity, a source of respect among peers, and an
honor for the girl‟s family. In some communities it becomes a passport to
marriage…The elaborate ceremonies such as songs, dances, chants, and teachings
about wifely duties create immense social pressure to conform…Sooner or later
[an uncircumcised girl] becomes an object of ridicule by her relatives and
neighbors…Ridicule can become ostracism, preventing any communal support at
a time when it is most needed.30
The cultural ceremonies surrounding circumcision are often deeply entrenched. For
example, in Meru, Kenya, circumcision is followed by a week of seclusion, during which
time the girl is subjected to moral and ancestral teachings. After that, a large celebration
is thrown; the family entertains relatives and friends and the parents show off their
daughter and their wealth.31
It is often the women of the society who defend the practice of circumcision
because they have so much invested in their social status as wife and mother.
Circumcision is a rite of passage for women in these cultures, and reaching womanhood
is as much a social identity as it is an individual identity. Esther Hicks says, “The social
identity of the individual is defined, circumscribed and guaranteed by the authority of the
community, and initiated by the relevant group. In the case of females, it is the elder
generation of women that initiates and carries out this ritual, and it is this privilege and
authority that they decline to relinquish.”32
30

Wangila, 100, 101.
Asha Mohamud, Samson Radeny, and Karin Ringheim, “Community-Based Efforts to End Female
Genital Mutilation in Kenya: Raising Awareness and Organizing Alternative Rites of Passage,” in Female
Circumcision: Multicultural Perspectives, ed. Rogaia Mustafa Abusharaf (Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania Press, 2006) 88.
32
Esther K. Hicks, Infibulation: Female Mutilation in Islamic Northeastern Africa (New Brunswick, New
Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 1993) 80.
31
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Second, religion is often cited as a reason. African culture is deeply religious, and
Africans often perceive everything that happens in life in religious terms, whether the
religion is indigenous religion, Islam, or Christianity. The world is not divided into the
secular and the sacred as it is in the West. “In all undertakings – whether it be
cultivating, sowing, harvesting, eating, traveling – religion is at work. To be born into
the African society is to be born into a culture that is intensely and pervasively religious
and that means, and requires, participating in the religious beliefs and rituals of the
community.”33 For example, when Kenyans reflect on their behavior, they consider
everyone who will be affected: friends, family, and the spirits of the departed.34 Their
worldview includes the supernatural, and they think that a full understanding of human
well-being requires a consideration of mystical forces. When a Kenyan suffers from a
disease, it is not enough to give a medical explanation. As Mary Nyangweso Wangila
says, “Possible actions of witches, sorcerers, ancestral spirits, or gods must be eliminated
before normal life can resume. Because reason alone cannot encompass every aspect of
truth, arguments about practices such as female circumcision that maintain they are
unnecessary or unnatural are doomed to fail.”35 Wangila calls this a belief in double
causality; illnesses may have natural and supernatural causes. Even a botched female
circumcision that results in the death of the girl may be explained in terms of the victim‟s
moral misconduct. “The circumciser may disclaim responsibility by claiming that the
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victim‟s parents committed adultery or that her grandparents or someone else in the
family violated a taboo.”36
The teachings of Islam are sometimes cited to justify the practice. The Koran
does not talk about female circumcision; however, some Muslims refer to the teachings
of the Hadith (the collection of Muhammad‟s teachings) that sanctions Abraham‟s
circumcision (and by extension the circumcision of all males and females) and mentions
a discussion held between Muhammad and a female circumciser in which Muhammad
allegedly endorsed the practice.37 Muslims who do not circumcise contest this
interpretation. In addition, some fatwas (authoritative edicts of Muslim leaders) have
been issued endorsing circumcision, but equally other fatwas have been issued
condemning the practice.38 Wangila says, “Conflicting opinions on the subject of female
circumcision among Muslims explains why some Muslims hold to this practice, while
others oppose it; female circumcision has an ambiguous link to religious duty that results
from inferences and interpretations of ambiguous scriptural verses to support popular
practice.”39
Christianity is also cited as requiring female circumcision. Although it is not
mentioned in the Bible (and Christians have historically been the one religious group
most opposed to the practice), some Christians infer that Abraham‟s circumcision is the
model for both males and females. As one of Wangila‟s female informants says, “Since
Abraham was circumcised as a sign of his faith in God, we also should emulate him if we
36
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want to be righteous before God as he was.”40 African Initiated Churches (AICs)
emerged as a reaction to Western colonialism, and they taught a form of Christianity that
was compatible with traditional African culture (Christianity without European
adornments). AICs are syncretistic, and they support a number of traditional practices
not found in Christianity elsewhere such as polygamy and female circumcision.
Third, circumcision is thought to be a means to control female sexuality.
Uncircumcised girls are thought to be unclean, promiscuous, and hyper-active sexually.
The removal of the clitoris especially, but also infibulation, is thought to remove sexual
desire and protect a girl‟s virginity. In one survey in Kenya, males said they would not
marry an uncircumcised female because “uncircumcised partners tend to seek divorce
more easily since they are more independent.”41 A woman‟s “oversexed nature” is a
threat to her husband, her family and to herself. As one villager said: “A woman is like a
plough-animal; she has no honor,” and as such, she can dishonor her husband unless strict
standards are followed.42 Although circumcision is not a guaranteed way to preserve a
girl‟s virginity, combined with a strict code of modesty and seclusion, it can provide a
“powerful physical and psychological deterrent to illicit sexual activities.”43 In a survey
of Kenyan females, all of the respondents (50) shared this sentiment. In other words, the
women agreed that circumcision controls female sexuality. “Kenya‟s Rendile people, for
example, believe that circumcision will reduce a wife‟s sexual desire and help her to
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control her sexual desire during the often long absences of a husband who may be away
for months at a time caring for animals in the bush or working in a larger town.”44
Fourth, circumcision is often justified as a prerequisite for marriage. For one,
circumcised girls are thought to make better wives. In one study, men perceived
uncircumcised women as “oversexed, unclean, rude, bossy, and disrespectful.”45 Second,
finding a good wife for a son (or having an eligible daughter) is highly valuable. One
African proverb says, “A good wife is more precious than gold.”46 Another says, “A
good wife is wealth.”47 These proverbs speak not only to the honor that a good wife
brings her husband, but also to the generous dowry she will bring her parents.
Infibulation is thought of as one way to protect a girl until marriage. The hijab (or veil)
acts in much the same way, symbolically protecting the female from the world outside.
Infibulation is an act of covering, and so protects the area of reproduction from the world.
Traditionally, there were two kinds of women: the protected and the unprotected.
“Mernissi has pointed out that women in early Islamic society were divided into two
categories: those who were free, and protected from violence and those who were slaves,
and were not…. Any woman who did not belong to a tribe and have the protection of a
well-armed husband was in danger of being captured, raped, or enslaved.”48
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Orthodox Judaism and End of Life Care
Case: Samuel Golubchuk
Mr. Golubchuck49 was an elderly Jewish man admitted to [the] hospital with
pneumonia and hypertension with a pre-existing brain injury that left him with
minimal brain function. His illness was so severe that he was soon transferred to
the ICU and intubated. There were few if any signs that he would recover. In
horrifying terms Mr. Golubchuck‟s physicians argued that to keep him on life
support was “torture” due to his increasingly complicated care, whereas his family
argued that to take him off life support was tantamount to “murder” according to
their Orthodox Jewish beliefs….In a striking move, Mr. Golubchuck‟s attending
physician resigned his position at the hospital over the case, followed by two
other intensivists who refused shifts in the ICU, arguing that to continue to treat
Mr. Golubchuck was a violation of their medical ethics and their prima facie duty
to “do no harm.” The physician graphically described that keeping Mr.
Golubchuck from his natural death required surgical “hacking away” at his
bedsores at the bedside in order to keep his infection at bay. Without reasonable
hope of benefit the physician characterized this kind of treatment as “assault” and
a “grotesque abomination”…Instead, Mr. Golubchuck was cared for by substitute
physicians and remained on life support for a total of seven and a half months. All
the while his family never stopped pleading the medical duty to act according to
his Orthodox Jewish beliefs. Mr. Golubchuck died while expert neurologists
representing both sides continued to debate the status of his brain function and
prognosis.50

Orthodox Judaism emphasizes the sanctity of life and strongly prohibits the
shortening of anyone‟s life. Fred Rosner, an Orthodox Jew, writes: “In Judaism every
human being is considered to be of supreme and infinite value. It is the obligation of
individuals and society to preserve, hallow, and dignify human life to care for the total
needs of all persons so that they can be healthy and productive members of society.”51
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The sanctity of life, he claims, is so important that it virtually trumps all other values.52
While discussing the Terri Schiavo case, Rosner says, “Euthanasia in any form is
condemned as an act of murder; shortening a person‟s life by even a moment is
tantamount to murder. The removal of Terri Schiavo‟s feeding tube was wrong in that it
would inevitably shorten her life and thus constitutes an act of murder.”53
Rosner cites the following reasons to support his claims. First, the Bible teaches
that human beings were created in the image of God, which means that human life has
supreme value.54 Second, the Bible strongly prohibits murder:
In Exodus 20:13, it is stated: “And if a man come presumptuously upon his
neighbor, to slay him with guile; thou shalt take him from Mine altar, that he may
die.” In Leviticus 24:17, there is the phrase “And he that smiteth any man
mortally shall surely be put to death” and four sentences later we find again…
“And he that killeth a man shall be put to death.” In Numbers 35:30, it is stated,
“Whoso killeth any person, the murderer shall be slain at the mouth of witnesses”
…Finally in Deuteronomy 5:17, the sixth commandment of the Decalogue is
repeated: “Thou shalt not kill.” Thus, in every book of the Pentateuch, we find at
least one reference to murder or killing.55
Third, euthanasia is also prohibited in the Bible. In I Samuel 31:1-6 and II Samuel 1:510, the story of Saul‟s death is told. It says that during a battle that went badly for Israel,
Saul was afraid and asked his armor-bearer to kill him with the sword. The armor-bearer
refused, so Saul fell upon his own sword. Later, David was asking a witness how he
learned of Saul‟s death, and the witness said he came upon Saul impaled on his spear.
Saul asked the man to finish him off, which he proceeded to do. David, then, put the
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witness to death, it is assumed, for an act of unjustified euthanasia.56 Fourth, euthanasia
is also prohibited in the Talmudic sources. For example, Rosner writes:
The Mishnah states as follows (Semachot 1:1): “One who is in a dying condition
(gosses) is regarded as a living person in all respects.” The Mishnah continues
(Semachot 1:2 to 4): … “One may not move him nor may one place him on sand
nor on salt until he dies. One may not close the eyes of the dying person. He who
touches them or moves them is shedding blood because Rabbi Meir used to say:
„This can be compared to a flickering flame. As soon as a person touches it, it
becomes extinguished. So too, whosoever closes the eyes of the dying is
considered to have taken his soul.” The fifth century Babylonian Talmud
(Shabbat 151b) mentions as follows: “He who closes the eyes of a dying person
while the soul is departing is a murderer.”57

Orthodox Judaism makes a moral distinction between withdrawing and
withholding life support to terminally ill patients. The latter is permissible, but the
former is not (unless judged “heroic”). The trouble for Jewish patients and family
members is that if they start treatment, they are obligated to continue treatment until the
“bitter end.” One Jewish scholar suggests a work-around for this problem: “connecting
the ventilator at the time of intubation for patients with unclear medical conditions to a
timer; if after comprehensive workup and clinical observation over the period of the timer
the patient does not improve, the timer would not be reset.”58 This solution would allow
the patient‟s condition to end her life without having to withdraw life support. Benjamin
Gesundheit, et. al. says that in certain cases withdrawing might be permissible: “There is
no obligation to artificially prolong life with heroic intervention in the ongoing process of
dying and, under such conditions… even cessation of treatment (but not active induction
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of death!) might be approved or even demanded by Jewish law.”59 However, the key
term here is “heroic,” for it seems that there will be a wide difference of opinion about
what counts as heroic when Judaism takes such a strong stand on the sanctity of life.
Recently, The American Journal of Bioethics published a target article based on
the Golubchuk case: “The Case of Samuel Golubchuk and the Right to Live.”60 The
authors, Alan Jotkowitz, Shimon Glick and Ari Z. Zivotofsky, tell how the College of
Physicians and Surgeons of Manitoba released a statement at the time of the case
(Golubchuk was from Manitoba, Canada). The statement says that physicians have the
final say whether to withdraw life support even if the patient and family disagree.
According to the statement,
“The criterion for maintaining life support is the ability of the patients to recover
to a level at which they are aware of themselves, their environment, and their
existence. If the family disagrees with this decision to terminate life support, the
physician must consult with another physician. If the consulted physician agrees,
therapy may be withdrawn over the objections of the patient/proxy/representative.
Even if the minimum therapeutic goal is achievable, but the physician concludes
nevertheless that life-sustaining therapy should be withdrawn, and he or she
obtains a consultant‟s agreement, the physician may withdraw life support over
the express opposition of the patient/proxy/representative, if the family is given
96 hours of notice before withdrawal of life support.61

Jotkowitz, Glick and Zivotofsky criticize the statement arguing that it (1) violates patient
autonomy, (2) lacks cultural sensitivity, (3) promotes the erosion of respect for life, and
(4) overlooks the fact that physician predictions are often wrong.

59

Benjamin Gesundheit, Avraham Steinberg, Shimon Glick, Reuven Or, Alan Jotkovitz, “Euthanasia: An
Overview and the Jewish Perspetive,” Cancer Investigation, 24 (2006) 626.
60
Alan Jotkowitz, Shimon Glick, Ari Z. Zivotofsky, “The Case of Samuel Golubchuk and the Right to
Live,” The American Journal of Bioethics 10 (2010) 50-53.
61
Jotkowitz, Glick, Zivotofsky, 50.

21

Faith Healing
Case: Pamela Hamilton
The Church of God of the Union Assembly in Lafollette, Tennessee had as one of
their tenets in 1983: “All members of the church are forbidden to use medicine,
vaccinations or shots of any kind but are taught by the church to live by faith.”62
This belief led to a confrontation when 12-year-old Pamela Hamilton, a member
of this community, was diagnosed with Ewing‟s Sarcoma that year. Dr. Frank
Haraf, an oncologist, became alarmed when Pamela did not return for treatment
because he was certain that she would die within three months unless treated.
Larry Hamilton, Pamela‟s father, said, “If you‟ve got a Chevrolet, you wouldn‟t
take it to Ford to get it repaired, would you? Just like your body, God made you.
Why take it to an off-brand to get something done to it. Just believe on him to get
it done and he‟ll take care of you.”63 Pamela shared her father‟s beliefs and
refused treatment, but the Court of Appeals invoked parens patriae and ordered
her to be admitted immediately for treatment, which was effective; however,
Pamela died from a relapse in 1985.64
Faith healing is a broad category. It could refer to the power of positive thinking,
mind over matter, or belief in miracles. It might not preclude standard medical treatment
(as when hospital patients are prayed for), or it might mean refusing treatment (as in the
case of Pamela Hamilton). For my purpose here, I will limit the scope of faith healing to
beliefs in miracles that result in refusal to receive standard medical treatment or in
demands to continue care deemed futile.
However, this raises another question: what is a miracle? Some use the word
“miracle” loosely such as in describing a “miracle drug.” Others use the word to describe
surprising medical results. As Cindy Hylton Rushton and Kathleen Russell write:
For example, health care professionals may use the language of miracles to
describe events that defy scientific and medical predictions. In this view, miracles
are based on care that is accomplished through technology and human
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engineering. For instance, critical care professionals may label situations where
the patient survives when all else fails as the “PICU Save” and claim a miracle
has occurred. From their perspective, such situations represent an event where the
expertise of the health care professionals and their technology contributed to
saving a patient from the jaws of death despite insurmountable odds.65
These definitions above do not include a supernatural component, so I will set them
aside. David Hume is thought to have given the standard philosophical definition of a
“miracle.” He says that a miracle is defined as “a violation of a law of nature.”66
However, he is ambiguous on the point because he also says that a miracle is “a violation
of a law of nature by a Deity or invisible agent.”67 The presence of these two definitions
in the same work have confounded Hume‟s interpreters, but I think that the second is
more applicable here. Nevertheless, I do not think that a miracle should be conceived of
as a “violation” of a law of nature because it is not compatible with how many traditional
theistic believers conceive of God‟s relationship with creation, which is as the author and
sustainer of the laws of nature, not as violator. For this reason, I will define a miracle as
divine intervention in the normal course of events (laws of nature).
Pamela Hamilton and her community relied on faith healing and were hoping for
a cure, but they also were resigned to it being Pamela‟s “time” if God so willed.
Although it is cases like Pamela‟s that make the news, it is not only obscure cult-like
groups that believe in miracles. Robert Orr describes a case in which a Pentecostal
family makes an M-request:
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Before this four-month-old boy was born with Down‟s syndrome and complex
anomalies of his heart, his devout Pentecostal parents named him after an Old
Testament patriarch. He had had four surgical interventions in an effort to
prolong his life, but he was now in multi-organ failure with no reasonable
likelihood of survival. For the preceding two weeks, his bedside nurses had urged
his physicians to persuade his parents to withdraw life support so that his
suffering might cease. When the surgeon approached the family with this strong
recommendation, they refused to consider withdrawal of life-support. They said
that God had spoken to his mother through scripture references which contained
the patient‟s first name, and in this manner had promised her that he would get
better as a testimony to the hospital staff and the community of God‟s power.68
Many mainstream Christians, and not just Pentecostals, believe God still speaks and heals
today, so it is not uncommon that Christians will make requests based on a personal
revelation from God.
Christian Science has received much attention for its hostile stance toward
traditional medicine. Its followers are taught to pursue healing through prayer, not
through traditional medicine: “For Christian Scientists, the power of prayer is superior to
standard medical treatment. The solicitation of medical care demonstrates weakness of
faith. Corroborative evidence for the success of spiritual healing is provided through
member testimonials by the recently cured and supported by at least three other church
members present during the patient‟s recovery. Since 1900, Christian Scientists have
reported over 53,000 healings from many diseases.”69
Christian Science teaches its followers to acquire a spiritual consciousness like
Jesus; it was this spiritual understanding of reality that enabled Jesus to heal illnesses.
Followers are taught that reality is spiritual and that once this spiritual awareness is
acquired, so-called physical healing will result. Allison W. Phinney, Jr. writes:
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“Christian Science treatment could not possibly heal as it does if everything were as
solidly material as it appears. But since it isn‟t, and what we see and experience so
vividly and sometimes painfully is a subjective mental impression, this fear and false
impression about God and His man can be changed by the omnipotence of divine
Mind.”70
Nevertheless, Christian Science treatments do not always work. Kenneth Hickey
and Laurie Lyckholm describe the following case:
In late Fall of 1992, James Andrew Wantland (Andrew), a twelve-year-old
seventh grader in La Habra, California began to experience lethargy, weight loss,
and frequent urination. Andrew began to complain to his father and paternal
grandmother about his symptoms on or about December 14, 1992. His father, a
Christian Scientist, felt his son‟s symptoms were transient and made little attempt
to address the issue. By December 17, 1992, Andrew was emaciated, vomiting,
and eating little. His father contacted a Christian Science practitioner who
provided healing prayer without actually coming to see Andrew. By December
20, 1992, Andrew experienced altered mental status and total exhaustion. A
Christian Science nurse was called to the family home. Upon her arrival, Andrew
was making no eye contact, was unresponsive, and had rapid, deep respirations.
At this time, Andrew‟s father decided to abandon spiritual healing and called 911.
Andrew was transported to the nearest hospital and was pronounced dead. The
medical examiner deemed the death to be the result of complications associated
with juvenile diabetes.71
Christian Science “practitioners” and “nurses” are trained in the ways of their founder,
Mary Baker Eddy. These ways do not include the basics of medical science, but they
include “bathing, making beds, wound care, and bandaging, and supporting the patient‟s
own prayer.”72 Also, while most forms of medical treatment are opposed, not all forms
are. These include: “orthopedic and dental treatments…as well as supportive equipment
70
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such as eyeglasses, crutches, and hearing aids.”73 In addition, the practice of praying for
sick individuals over the phone is common, so Andrew‟s case is typical even if the
outcome is not.

Conclusion
In this chapter, I have examined four common cases: M-requests made by
Jehovah‟s Witnesses, some African communities, Orthodox Jews, and religions that
believe in faith healing. In each case, I have explored the practices and traditions of the
communities involved and the reasons given to defend the M-requests.
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CHAPTER THREE
Liberty of Conscience and the Standard of Care
In this chapter, I examine the liberty of conscience and its limits, showing that
respect for matters of conscience is an important principle. Second, I explore the
standard of care, the clinical point of view, to best understand the reasons for the conflict
between matters of conscience and the clinic. Next, I consider three unsatisfying or
incomplete approaches to handling M-requests, setting the stage for a phronesis-based
proposal.

The Liberty of Conscience
The human conscience is the faculty that reflects on questions of morality,
meaning, and the good life, and decides, for each person, what the answers to these
questions are. The liberty of conscience is the notion that the conscience needs to be free
from interference to act effectively. This liberty is enshrined in the First Amendment to
the U.S. Constitution: “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” The first part is known as the
Establishment Clause, which is interpreted as saying that the government should not
show preference to a religion; the second part is known as the Free Exercise Clause,
which is interpreted as meaning that citizens are free to believe what they want and free
to act on their beliefs.
In Liberty of Conscience, Martha Nussbaum describes six normative principles
that are recognized by the First Amendment.74 First, the Equality Principle is the
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principle that citizens have equal rights under the law. As Nussbaum says, “we want not
just enough freedom, but a freedom that is itself equal, and that is compatible with all
citizens being fully equal and being equally respected by the society in which they
live.”75 Because of this principle, the liberty of conscience is sometimes called “the equal
liberty of conscience,” emphasizing the fact that conscience is common to all citizens and
needs to be equally protected.
Second, the Respect-Conscience Principle recognizes the important role
conscience plays as the faculty that determines life‟s meaning. Nussbaum, expounding
on Roger Williams‟ defense of religious liberty, says: “Conscience…is the dignity of the
person; it is, indeed, the person himself. So: everyone has inside something infinitely
precious, something that demands respect from us all, and something in regard to which
we are all basically equal.”76 This principle also recognizes that in any society, especially
a pluralistic one, there are diverse commitments of conscience and that each one, being
infinitely valuable, should be respected.
Third, the Liberty Principle says that if we are to respect conscience, it must be
adequately free with respect to constraints so that it can function properly. Nussbaum
says, “Understanding what conscience is like and what it needs, we see that it requires
substantial (and equal) religious liberty, including liberty of belief and speech, liberty of
religious practice (within limits set by the rights of others), and the liberty of religious
bodies to organize their own affairs (again within some limits).”77 In describing the
nature of the conscience, John Locke describes how we cannot force someone to believe
75
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something: “[The conscience] cannot be compelled to the belief of any thing by outward
force. Confiscation of estate, imprisonment, torments, nothing of that nature can have
any such efficacy as to make men change the inward judgment that they have framed of
things.”78
Fourth, the Accommodation Principle says that in some cases, in order to respect
conscience, religious citizens should be exempt from generally applicable laws, which
means that occasionally the protection of conscience can trump the interests of the state.
For example, in time of war, some citizens should be exempt from military service. As
George Washington wrote to Quaker conscientious objectors in 1789: “I assure you very
explicitly, that in my opinion the conscientious scruples of all men should be treated with
great delicacy and tenderness: and it is my wish and desire, that the laws may always be
as extensively accommodated to them, as a due regard for the protection and essential
interests of the nation may justify and permit.”79 A recent case in Florida challenged this
principle: a Muslim woman was not permitted to wear her veil in her driver‟s license
photograph. She took her case to court, but lost. The court ruled that there was a
compelling state interest in having uncovered faces on identification cards.80 While this
may have been a reasonable ruling, consider another recent case involving Muslim dress:
on April 11, 2011, France outlawed entirely the wearing of the Muslim burqa. French
President Sarkozy said, “The veils are an assault on French values of secularism and

78

John Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration (Buffalo, New York: Prometheus Books, 1990) 20.
Nussbaum, 115.
80
Case discussed in Nussbaum, Liberty of Conscience, 347.
79

29

equality of the sexes…the burqa isolate(s) women and take(s) away their humanity.”81
Another French official said, “You can‟t have things like men and women refusing to
shake each other‟s hands, and separate hours for boys and girls at the public swimming
pool. That‟s just not France.”82 The French ban seems to be based entirely on the values
of unity and conformity, but unless it can be shown that essential interests are at stake, it
seems that the ban constitutes an unjust infringement of religious liberty.
Fifth, the Nonestablishment Principle says that the state should not show
preference to a religion because doing so would violate the Equality Principle and the
Respect-Conscience Principle. Nussbaum explains why religious establishment is wrong:
(1) It will encourage religious political competition (factionalism), (2) the state will
interfere with the internal affairs of religion, (3) it may be difficult for the state to avoid
coercing its citizens, and (4) it undermines equality since the establishment suggests that
outsiders are not equal members of the community. 83 Many countries do not support this
principle, for example, England, which recognizes an official church, and Iran, which
recognizes only Shia Islam. This principle was hotly contested in the U.S. in 2001 when
Chief Justice Roy Moore was fired for resisting the order to remove a monument of the
Ten Commandments from an Alabama judicial building.
Finally, the Separation Principle says that to some degree, church and state must
be separate in order to respect most of the principles already listed, especially the
Establishment Principle. If the state is to remain neutral with regards to religion, then
81
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there must be some degree of separation between the two realms. John Locke argues:
“The church itself is a thing absolutely separate and distinct from the commonwealth.
The boundaries on both sides are fixed and immoveable. He jumbles heaven and earth
together, the things most remote and opposite, who mixes these societies, which are in
their original, end, business, and in every thing, perfectly distinct, and infinitely different
from each other.”84 This is not, as some think, to promote secularism as the state
“religion;” this would also be a violation of both the Equality and Establishment
Principles, nor is it a total separation. As Nussbaum remarks: “Imagine what it would be
like if the fire department refused to aid a burning church, if churches didn‟t have access
to the public water supply or the sewer system, if the police would not investigate crimes
on church property, if clergy could not vote or run for office. Such proposals seem
horribly unfair, because the state is providing all these forms of support for everyone
else.”85 The actual degree of separation is determined by the minimum requirements of
the principles above.
Of course, there are limits to the liberty of conscience. Traditionally, those limits
have been framed in terms of the avoidance of harm; in other words, conscience should
be free unless the exercise of conscience will result in harm to others. Violating the
rights of others and disturbing the peace may also be limits to this liberty.
Should liberty of conscience extend to the clinic? Most certainly it should. If
citizens should be free to hold beliefs and act on those beliefs, it would be unnatural to
limit such freedoms to certain areas of public life. It is in the clinic, moreover, where
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citizens, as patients, come face to face with their deepest beliefs, and it would be callous
to deprive them of this basic liberty when it matters most. As Christopher Meyers
explains: “Hospital stays are rarely good times and religion provides great support and
comfort to many patients and their families. Religious beliefs also closely inform
patients‟ and surrrogates‟ choices; every clinician has repeatedly heard the request,
„Please give Mom just a few more days while we pray for a miracle.‟”86 In addition,
religious beliefs are an important part of patient well-being. David B. Larson and Susan
S. Larson discuss patient survey data and studies in which patients view their religion as
important to coping with illness, depression, and stress. Harold G Koenig et al. write:
Religious beliefs and practices reduce the sense of loss of control and helplessness
that accompanies physical illness. Religious beliefs provide a cognitive
framework that can reduce suffering and increase one‟s purpose and meaning in
the face of loss of other previously relied-upon sources of self-esteem. Private
religious activities such as prayer reduce the sense of isolation and increase the
patient‟s sense of control over the illness. Praying to God may not only relieve
the patient‟s loneliness, but belief in an all-powerful, loving, and responsive God
can give patients the sense that they can influence their own condition by possibly
influencing God to act on their behalf. Public religious behaviors that improve
coping during times of physical illness include participating in worship services,
praying with others (and having others pray for one‟s health), being visited by
clergy at home or in the hospital, and talking with the hospital chaplain.87
Caring for patients holistically (their general well-being) requires respecting their
religious beliefs. However, some may rightly point out that respecting conscience in the
clinic can sometimes conflict with the standard of care.
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The Standard of Care
The standard of care is a legal concept that sets the minimum for physician
conduct. George J. Annas says, “[the] standard is generally defined simply as what a
reasonably prudent physician (or specialist) would do in the same or similar
circumstances.”88 Le Puma et al. describe two components of the standard of care: (1)
what is medically indicated and (2) what is legally required. Le Puma et al. relate the
first component to Aristotle‟s notion of techne, or technical knowledge. They say, “Once
clinical practice or clinical trials prove a treatment to be beneficial and better than
alternative therapies, it becomes the standard of care. A medical procedure is „indicated‟
when it has proved to be efficacious.”89 They relate the second component to Aristotle‟s
notion of nomos, or the law: “Mandating similar actions for similar physicians in similar
situations.”90
While Annas‟ definition above is sufficient for my purposes here, it should be
pointed out that the term is subject to debate. As Harvey J. Blumenthal and John R.
Woodard explain, the term is not used carefully: “[the standard of care] is a legal concept
which increasingly is found in medical writings, often without being defined.”91 They
show that authors may use the term for impact, just to give authority to their
recommendations. Some articles, they explain, use the term in the title, but offer only
“guidelines,” which is confusing since “guidelines” sounds much weaker than
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“standards.” Also, the concept varies slightly from state to state. For example,
Massachusetts law defines the standard of care as “the care that the average qualified
physician would provide,”92 and Kansas law defines it in terms of best judgment:
“Where, under the usual practice of the profession of the defendant, different courses of
treatment are available which might reasonably be used, the specialist has a right to use
his best judgment in the selection of the choice of treatment. However, the selection
must be consistent with the skill and care which other specialists practicing in the same
field of expertise would use in similar circumstances.”93
The standard of care is grounded in evidence-based medicine. Marcia Angell,
who was the executive editor of The New England Journal of Medicine, describes the
evidence-based approach: “Perhaps the most important hallmark of science is its utter
reliance on evidence. Furthermore, the evidence must be objectively verifiable. This
reliance on concrete evidence distinguishes science from all other human
endeavors…Medical conclusions are no different from other scientific matters, because
the body is a part of nature.”94
This approach to medicine has its critics, especially in the supporters of
complementary and alternative medicine (CAM). Angell has defended evidence-based
medicine against charges of establishment bias from CAM supporters arguing that good
evidence “must offer a plausible biological mechanism for effects reported.”95 Such
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evidence apparently rules out CAM treatments such as homeopathy, moxibustion, and
intercessory prayer. David J. Hufford explains that the evidence-based approach is
connected to what he calls the theoretical plausibility criterion:
The theoretical plausibility criterion asserts that (1) all valid knowledge will prove
to be coherent (that is, to follow logically without inconsistencies or gaps) with
some characteristics of established contemporary science (known biological
mechanisms in Dr. Angell‟s instance), and (2) that the likelihood that a claim will
eventually have this coherent relation to contemporary science can be judged on
the basis of present knowledge.96
Hufford‟s analysis of the theoretical plausibility criterion produces the following
components:
(a) Existing conventional scientific knowledge is an adequate measure of whether an
unconventional claim is true.
(b) Empirical evidence of an event that is not theoretically plausible can be rejected
out of hand.
(c) If a practice lacks theoretical plausibility there is no reason to think that it may
work.
(d) Acceptance of theoretically implausible claims would require the abandonment of
current scientific knowledge.
(e) There is no such thing as CAM, there is just medicine that is supported by solid
research and medicine that is not.97
Hufford rightly questions each of these components, claiming that they represent expert
paternalism and infringe on the process of free inquiry. However, I do not have the space
here to explore his argument.
Grounded, as it is, in evidence-based medicine, the standard of care may, at times,
conflict with the liberty of conscience, but it does not follow that the standard of care
should run roughshod over commitments of conscience. The liberty of conscience, as a
96
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prima facie right, means that we seriously consider M-requests that violate the standard
of care, which is in keeping with the Respect-Conscience and Accommodation principles.
Some might object that this fails to take seriously the consciences of health care
providers, who are just as much worthy of respect. There are two parts to this objection:
(1) the standard of care is something like a professional conscience, and it would be a
violation of this professional conscience to honor an M-request;98 and (2) caregivers have
their own personal convictions, some of which are based on religious beliefs, and it
would be insensitive to require them to act contrary to their own consciences (this
broaches the topic of conscience clauses in health care). I do not have the space here to
respond in depth to these concerns, but to say that in the current patient-centered
environment where patient autonomy is heralded as the highest value, the conscience of
the patient naturally comes first. Physicians are bearers of conscience too, but they are
representatives of a professional institution, one that is meant to serve the public, and the
liberty of conscience was meant to protect individual religious convictions, not matters of
professional conduct (although those are important too). Also, enough has been said
about conscience clauses in the literature to provide, I believe, enough accommodation to
professionals who feel conflicted in honoring an M-request.
Macklin’s Approach
However, this is not to advocate some kind of moral relativism. Liberty of
conscience is not an absolute. If it were an absolute, it could be used to justify atrocious
acts such as the Jonestown massacre when, in 1978, Jim Jones instructed his followers to
98
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consume a cyanide-laced drink. Parents were to give it first to their children and then lie
down and die next to them in a mass murder-suicide. Religious liberty cannot vindicate
such actions. Ruth Macklin argues, “It is one thing to require that cultural, religious, and
ethnic groups be treated as equals; that conforms to the principle of justice as equality. It
is quite another thing to say that any cultural practice whatsoever of any group is to be
tolerated and respected equally. This latter view is a statement of extreme ethical
relativism.”99 Macklin is right to want to avoid this type of relativism.
However, Macklin argues against what she calls “respect for tradition,” which she
considers is simply a “convenient injunction for people in power – usually defenders of
the status quo – to keep the system that sustains their power intact.”100 She thinks that
such a maxim may serve anthropologists well in the field, but it is not an ethical principle
that can justify a cultural practice. She says that it is possible that one might show
respect for tradition on utilitarian grounds on occasion, but one need not respect tradition
for its own sake. She says,
It might be argued that respect for tradition could be considered part of respect for
autonomy, but that maneuver will not stand up to ethical scrutiny. Application of
the principle “respect for autonomy” cannot require that any actions whatever that
flow from the capacity for self-determination must be judged ethically acceptable.
People who engage in political torture, commit domestic violence, and sterilize
people without their consent may all be acting autonomously, but they do not
deserve respect. The same is true for traditions that individuals or a cultural
group autonomously accept and adhere to. Some traditional practices are
harmful, even evil, some are beneficial, and others are ethically neutral. The mere
fact that it is a “tradition” says nothing about the moral value that should be
99
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attached to it. Just as laws maybe be enacted, criticized, or overturned for ethical
reasons, so too may customs and traditions be subjected to ethical scrutiny.101
In short, tradition is not valuable in itself, according to Macklin, and respecting tradition
is not a normative principle on par with other principles like autonomy, beneficence,
nonmaleficence, and justice.
Macklin uses the case of African female circumcision as an example. She notes
that anthropologists who defend (or do not adamantly oppose) the practice do so for a
number of reasons: (1) out of cultural sensitivity, (2) out of concern that criticism will
only more deeply entrench the practice, and (3) out of the desire to avoid appearances of
cultural imperialism.102 She says that the mutilation of female genitals is a brutal
violation of women‟s rights, and the practice violates the principle of nonmaleficence.
No appeal to respect for tradition can justify the practice.
While I do agree with Macklin‟s conclusion about female circumcision, she is
mistaken about the way to arrive there. She seems to think that the standard principles of
biomedical ethics are sufficient. She tells a story of teaching the principles to a group of
cross-cultural workers: “I stated and explicated the principles of nonmaleficence,
beneficence, respect for persons, and prominent principles of justice. When I had
finished, one participant asked: „Are these the only fundamental ethical
principles?‟…Turning the challenge back to them, I asked if they could provide examples
of candidates for coequal principles. One person proposed „respect for tradition.‟ Never
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having heard this proposed as an ethical principle, I wondered whether it should qualify
as one.”103
Macklin concludes that respect for tradition should not qualify as an ethical
principle. On the face of it, she seems right, but if tradition is a part of culture, and
culture is a part of our identity, then tradition is worthy of respect – if for no other reason
than it is derivative from respect for persons. Respect for tradition can also be conceived
as a component of the principle “respect for conscience” (or Respect-Conscience
Principle), which can also be shown to be closely linked to the principle of respect for
persons. To respect people is to respect them as bearers of conscience, as Nussbaum
argues above.
Contrary to what some might say, the principle of autonomy is compatible with
receiving one‟s beliefs from tradition, culture, and religion. As Beauchamp and
Childress explain, “No fundamental inconsistency exists between autonomy and
authority, because individuals can exercise their autonomy in choosing to accept an
institution, tradition, or community that they view as a legitimate source of direction.
Having welcomed the authority of his or her religious institution, a Jehovah‟s Witness
can refuse a recommended blood transfusion…That we share moral principles in no way
prevents them from being our principles.”104 There is a philosophical conundrum here
that might be expressed in the dilemma: “autonomy today or autonomy tomorrow?” It is
not entirely clear how we can protect our autonomy tomorrow if we surrender to
authority today. If we second-guess the same authority at every turn, have we really
103
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accepted that authority?105 This concern is valid and probably indicates a nonvirtuous
epistemic practice that should be avoided (call it total-epistemic-surrender).
Nevertheless, I think a middle ground can be staked out. There is an autonomy
somewhere between total epistemic surrender and absolute independence that is in
keeping with proper epistemic functioning. Anyway, a view of autonomy that precludes
a patient from adopting the moral views of others in her community is unrealistic; it
overemphasizes the value of individualism and overlooks the social nature of belief
acquisition.
To reiterate, this respect for conscience does not amount to moral relativism: it is
not to say that conscience (or autonomy as Macklin recognizes) trumps everything, but
the liberty of conscience is a fundamental right. What Macklin overlooks, at a minimum,
is the virtue of cultural sensitivity. Even the authors of Principles of Biomedical Ethics,
the source of the principles she defends, recognize now that the bioethical principles
alone are not sufficient as a guide for medical practice. Professionals, they say, need to
cultivate moral virtues in their characters in order to cultivate good judgment, and
arguably, cultural sensitivity is one of those virtues insofar as it considers patients‟
background beliefs and respects the patients‟ commitments of conscience. Macklin‟s
analysis of the female circumcision case omits any serious reflection on the reasons a
group might have to engage in such a practice, choosing, instead, to only consider nonreligious reasons and factors such as harm, coercion, and sexual misinformation. She
jumps to an examination of the practice in terms of the principles of bioethics, but she
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does so without taking the cultural background seriously; hence, I find her approach to be
culturally insensitive.
Carter and Klugman’s Approach
Macklin‟s approach avoids moral relativism, but at the cost of being culturally
insensitive. Michele A. Carter and Craig M. Klugman propose a model for clinical ethics
consultations called “Cultural Engagement,” which touts cultural understanding over the
resolution of moral conflict.106 They are committed to multiculturalism, which means
“that a person understands, appreciates, and values his or her own culture, but in addition
has an informed respect and curiosity about the cultures of others.”107 In addition they
base their model on three principles: (1) the principle of mutual respect, which entails a
certain degree of respect for every culture; (2) the principle of vulnerability, which means
that patients are in a vulnerable situation requiring great care, especially ones from other
cultures; and (3) the principle of cultural relevance, which states that ethical conflicts are
not solved by “the application of rules, principles, and theories of a dominant medical
culture.”108 Instead, the way through conflict, they argue, is by means of the
conversational process in which both provider and patient engage each other‟s cultural
and ethical beliefs. To Carter and Klugman, trust is more fundamental than bioethical
principles, and their model is an approach that emphasizes learning and understanding
over problem-solving.
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While Carter and Klugman‟s approach is culturally sensitive and supplies a
needed perspective to clinical ethics, they do not intend to supply a decision-making
framework to resolve moral conflict. Austin Dacey, in his book The Secular Conscience:
Why Belief Belongs in Public Life, provides a notion of respect for conscience that lays a
foundation for a decision-making framework. He criticizes secular liberalism for similar
reasons that Macklin criticizes her opponents, but Dacey‟s approach avoids cultural
insensitivity, while at the same time, providing a guide for proper epistemic functioning.
Dacey begins by identifying two liberal fallacies: the Privacy and Liberty
Fallacies:
The Privacy Fallacy: this fallacy consists in assuming that because matters of
conscience are private in the sense of nongovernmental, they are private in the
sense of personal preference.
The Liberty Fallacy: this fallacy begins in the core liberal principle that
conscience must be left free from coercion. The mistake lies in thinking that
because conscience is free from coercion, it must be free from criticism, reason,
truth, or independent, objective standards of right and wrong.109
These fallacies have influenced the medical profession as well, so when M-requests are
made that entail only minor medical risk, caregivers comply out of “respect,” citing
privacy and liberty. But this is not true respect.
As Dacey explains, this is just blanket acceptance or disregard. True respect takes
matters of conscience seriously, considering others‟ beliefs important and possibly true.
True respect means holding such beliefs to the standards of the public square: “honesty,
consistency, rationality, evidential support, feasibility, legality, morality, and
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revisability,”110 and it is compatible with, even requires, the possibility of disagreement.
Dacey says, “Understood correctly, respect is not just compatible with criticism – it
entails criticism. To respect someone we must take him seriously, and taking someone
seriously sometimes means finding fault with him.”111
However, this type of critical engagement, or true respect, is rare in the clinic.
Religious beliefs are often a conversation stopper, and caregivers feel uncomfortable
asking questions that could be perceived as challenging a patient‟s religious beliefs. For
this reason, it is convenient to rationalize the honoring of M-requests as respect for
patient autonomy, and in our modern patient-centered era, this is widely practiced.
In pediatrics, this non-engagement of religious beliefs is reinforced in law because
some states have legal exemptions for religiously motivated medical neglect: “A total of
32 states provide a defense for felonious child neglect, manslaughter, or murder, where
the child‟s life was sacrificed for religious reasons, as well as a religious defense for
misdemeanors arising from physical harm to children resulting from medical neglect.”112
These laws perpetuate the widespread feeling in the clinic, that M-requests are to be,
always and in every place, honored.
Nevertheless, pediatrics supplies another example: medical professionals do
occasionally intervene and even remove children from parental custody when an Mrequest will result in great risk to a child, but this falls short of critical engagement
because such cases are marked by a lack of consideration of the beliefs themselves – only
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a consideration of the medical risks. As such, caregivers operate on the assumption that
the family‟s beliefs are false or irrelevant and that a secular conception of the no-harm
principle trumps all competing values. This is because members of the medical
community are primarily trained to make decisions as professionals based on the notions
of medical harm and benefit.
In short, the status quo fails to adequately respect the religious beliefs of patients.
Sometimes, caregivers grant M-requests; sometimes, they do not. But the common
theme is that religious beliefs are undervalued. They are undervalued to the extent that
they are not critically engaged. One promising solution to this problem is Christopher
Meyers‟ model for handling M-requests. It is that to which I now turn.
Meyers’ Approach
Meyers proposes rationality criteria for judging whether a surrogate‟s M-request
should be honored. His standard is internal consistency (a coherence theory of
rationality), which he argues for in the following way: (1) on the basis that it is an easily
accessible standard, that is, physicians can feel confident in applying it; (2) he thinks that
it is generous and culturally sensitive, reinforcing “commitments to the liberal principles
of religious tolerance and pluralism;”113 and (3) it avoids the “insurmountable problems”
that plague foundationalist theories of rationality (although he says nothing about what
these insurmountable problems are).
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Meyers preferred version of the coherence theory of rationality is called reflective
equilibrium, and he quotes Beauchamp and Childress (who discuss John Rawls) for an
explanation:
The goal of reflective equilibrium is to match, prune, and adjust considered
judgments in order to render them coherent with the premises of our most general
moral commitments. We start with paradigm judgments of moral rightness and
wrongness, and then construct a more general and more specific account that is
consistent with these paradigm judgments, rendering them as coherent as possible.
We then test the resultant action guides to see if they yield incoherent results. If
so, we readjust just these guides or give them up and then renew the process.114
According to this theory, all beliefs are open to revision given tension in the system, even
religious beliefs.
Meyers says, “There are no external standards of justification; internal
consistency is all that is required.”115 Under this view, beliefs are not evaluated on
whether they are factual or conform to certain theological or ethical principles, and there
need not be any universal conception of human nature. All that is required is that the
beliefs not contradict. He gives an example of a pair of conflicting beliefs: (1) God is
omnipotent, and (2) God cannot affect human affairs. Religious beliefs, according to
Meyers, can be either rational (coherent), irrational (incoherent), or nonrational (when a
pair of beliefs neither cohere nor contradict).
Meyers then appeals to Robert Audi‟s principles to show why religious beliefs
should be subject to secular standards. Audi‟s three principles summarized by Meyers
are:
1. The Principle of Secular Rationale: If one must constrain the freedom of
others, one ought to have nonreligious reasons.
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2. The Principle of Secular Motivation: One‟s nonreligious reasons to constrain
the freedom of others should be reason enough, so that if the religious reasons
were eliminated, the choice would still be made.
3. The Principle of Theo-Ethical Equilibrium: One‟s religious and ethical beliefs
should be consistent.116
Meyers thinks that these principles should be applied to surrogate decision making
because a surrogate decision maker‟s decisions can have a huge impact on the patient –
much like public policy has an impact on others in Audi‟s example. Meyers, however,
modifies Audi‟s principles into a two-part rule to apply to the clinic:
Part I: When a surrogate‟s choices directly affect a patient‟s length or quality of
life, decision makers should be sufficiently motivated by secular reasons;
Part II: When religious beliefs are also present, those beliefs must be rational, that
is, they must cohere with the decision maker‟s other religious and moral
beliefs.117
If an M-request is made that violates either of the two parts of this rule, it should not be
honored.
Meyers‟ shows how this might work in two cases. In the first, a 65-year-old
woman with end-stage cancer is ventilator-dependent and fully sedated. Her oldest son is
not the only family member, but he is making decisions for her. He instructs physicians
to do everything in their power, believing that God will save his mother. When he learns
that the pain medication she is on may be interfering with her recovery, he demands that
it be stopped in spite of being told that it is necessary for her comfort. He says that the
pain medication is getting in the way of God‟s desire to heal her. Using his two-part rule,
Meyers says that it is not clear whether the son satisfies the first part, but he clearly fails
116
117

Eskew and Meyers, 5.
Eskew and Meyers, 5.

46

the second (the coherency test). In the first place, the son believes that a person should
not be allowed to suffer when there are means available, but he refuses further pain
medication for his mother. Second, the son believes that God is omnipotent but also that
pain medication can frustrate God‟s plans to heal. Third, he believes, according to his
religion, that he must honor his parents, but he is dismissive of his mother‟s life plans as
communicated through other family members. He is also disrespectful of his father, who
is present, but not allowed (by the son) to make decisions about his wife‟s care. Because
of these inconsistencies, Meyers believes that the son‟s requests should be verbally
opposed and probably overruled.
In the second case, an adult child of two JWs has cerebral palsy and needs surgery
for a kidney blockage. The parents inform the hospital staff of the patient‟s firm JW
beliefs and demand a bloodless surgery. The hospital seeks to move her to a hospital that
specializes in bloodless surgeries, but the transfer is unlikely. The parents take their child
home to wait for an opening, but this probably means that the child will die. Meyers
thinks that this case satisfies the two-part rule. The first part of the rule is satisfied (the
secular reason) because there is good evidence that the patient would have made the same
request if she were able. The secular principle is a respect for autonomy. The second
part of the rule would also be satisfied, Meyers claims, because while the parents want
their child to survive, they simply desire more to protect her eternal life with God. There
are no contradictions in their beliefs or behaviors.
Although Meyers‟ two-part rule seems reasonable on the face of it, it suffers from
a number of problems. I am aware that Meyers intends his rule only to apply to surrogate
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decision making, but I am interested in the possibility of its solving the larger problem
too (M-requests made by surrogates and patients themselves). First I will examine the
first part of the rule. To require surrogates (or patients if we apply the rule more widely)
to provide secular reasons to accompany an M-request is (1) too burdensome and (2) does
not take religious beliefs seriously enough. First, it is too burdensome because average
religious believers often do not have the level of education or training necessary to speak
the language of the public square adequately. Most people, let alone religious believers,
are only conversant with their own cultures. What this rule requires is that religious
believers learn the dominant culture and language of the clinic (for example, bioethical
principles like autonomy), but why should they shoulder this burden? At the time the Mrequest is made, it is unlikely that a surrogate, assuming the surrogate is closely related to
the patient, would be able to take a “crash course in secular reason.” Even if the
surrogate were not weighed down with other concerns, it is unlikely that enough time
would be available for the surrogate to learn how to translate her beliefs into a secular
rationale before the patient expires or the situation changes. While some religions may
assist surrogates in this (supplying informational pamphlets to give to doctors), it seems
unreasonable to expect that every surrogate or religious group be so prepared. Moreover,
it seems that society (or the state) should make accommodations for the individual, not
the other way around. In Liberty of Conscience, Martha Nussbaum, in describing the
Accommodation Principle, says that in order to respect matters of conscience, religious
citizens should be exempt from generally applicable laws.118 As mentioned earlier, she
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quotes from George Washington‟s letter to the Quakers in 1789, which says: “I assure
you very explicitly, that in my opinion the conscientious scruples of all men should be
treated with great delicacy and tenderness: and it is my wish and desire, that the laws may
always be as extensively accommodated to them, as a due regard for the protection and
essential interests of the nation may justify and permit.”119 In Washington‟s example, it
is the state that makes the accommodation (the sacrifice), while the religious group
benefits.
In addition, the surrogacy case is significantly disanalogous to Audi‟s public
policy scenario because a surrogate is often related to the patient, unlike those in the
public policy arena whose decisions will constrain the liberty of others unrelated to them.
To require secular reasons in surrogacy cases is more intrusive because this involves
intervening in and sometimes breaking the bonds of a family unit.
Second, the first part of the rule does not take religious beliefs seriously enough.
Audi‟s principle of secular motivation requires that the course of action would still be
chosen if the religious reason dropped out. I interpret Audi to mean that religious reasons
do not provide a sufficient justification on which to base public policy decisions, and I
interpret Meyers‟ rule to mean that religious reasons do not provide a sufficient
justification on which to base surrogate decision making. While such a rule may be
appropriate on the public policy level because the decisions being made constrain the
liberty of other citizens, it is not appropriate in the clinic where families and patients are
suffering. It is at these times that religious beliefs should be given the most
accommodation, but Meyers‟ rule disallows faith when it matters most. Taking religious
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beliefs seriously entails acknowledging that they might be sufficient justification for
actions, even actions that affect others. Of course, there are limits to the type of actions
that can be justified this way, but it is far from clear that surrogate decision making is one
of those limits, especially when the surrogate is acting on the perceived best interests of
the patient.
The second part of Meyers‟ rule, the coherency requirement, suffers from a
couple of problems. First, it may be necessary, but it is not sufficient as a criterion to
limit M-requests. As Meyers writes, “Internal consistency is surely the least one can
expect of decision makers when their choices potentially harm others.”120 While this is
true, certainly much more should be expected; for example, the choices should be
compassionate, courageous, and just. Consider Meyers‟ first case. The problem with the
elder son is not just that he holds inconsistent theological and ethical beliefs and that his
actions do not match up with his stated beliefs; the problem is that the son seems to have
a control issue. He oversteps his father‟s authority and ignores the points of view of
everyone else in the family, including his mother‟s. He also lacks compassion: he seems
to care little for his mother‟s suffering, only caring that God‟s power be demonstrated in
her survival. His theological beliefs are not only inconsistent, but also they are probably
aberrant, meaning they depart greatly from the teachings of his religious community.
Such a conflict could be resolved by putting the son in conversation with someone from
his church or someone who represents his religion such as a chaplain. The son‟s
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treatment requests should not be honored, not for the reasons that Meyers‟ gives, but
because his requests are callous and cavalier.
Meyers grants his blessing on the M-request in the second case (The JW case)
because it can be shown that the parents‟ theological and ethical beliefs are coherent.
However, just because a surrogate‟s beliefs are coherent does not mean that they should
be honored. The beliefs of the parents of the followers of Jim Jones (of the Jonestown
tragedy) may be shown to be coherent, but that hardly means that their beliefs and
choices should be tolerated. Instead, it is more likely that the epistemic practices of the
Jonestown community were deeply deficient, for example, instead of being open to the
views of others outside the community, the people insulated themselves from the outside
(which is the reason the People‟s Temple moved from California to Guyana). They
cultivated epistemic vices, not virtues. And it is for this reason we can refuse to tolerate
the choices that followed. The JW case is much the same. JW parents may forfeit their
surrogacy rights if their beliefs are not formed in a reasonable way, and while consistency
is an important aspect of reasonableness, it is not the only one.
If we apply the coherency requirement to the African Female Circumcision case,
we encounter a similar problem. The practice of female circumcision does not seem to
contradict the beliefs of the parents or communities that practice it. In fact, it appears that
the belief coheres well with their religious beliefs. On their view, it is mandated by God
(Islam, Christianity, and others have been used to defend the practice). It also coheres
well with their belief that female hyper-sexuality is a bad thing. To supporters, what
better way to control female sexuality but through a clitoridectomy? It also coheres well
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with the traditional view that a virgin bride is a good thing, so parents should “protect”
their daughters by sewing them up. It appears that the coherency requirement would
condone such a practice, but to many, this is deeply troubling. Female circumcision
dehumanizes women. It seems to represent, as Dr. Jordan believes (in the earlier case) an
“unacceptable disfigurement, repression, and control of women.” But if this is the
appropriate conclusion, Meyers‟ rule will not deliver the goods.
An additional worry with the coherency requirement is that all religions have
coherency “problems” (so do scientific theories such as the wave-particle duality theory
of light). In other words, there are apparent contradictions in even the most wellestablished religions, and since this is the case, it is not clear that any religion would pass
Meyers‟ test. To provide a couple of examples: Christianity teaches that God does not
want anyone to go to hell (2 Peter 3:9) but also that God is omnipotent, so he could save
everyone if he wanted (but apparently does not). Buddhism teaches the doctrine of
reincarnation but also the doctrine of anatta (no self). If there is no self, then what is
reincarnated? For centuries, religious scholars in both traditions have wrestled with these
problems and suggested various solutions, but it is unlikely that these problems will be
solved anytime soon.
A possible rejoinder is that many so-called “contradictions” are not contradictions
at all, but only “paradoxes,” the difference being that paradoxes are merely apparent
contradictions. Religious scholars from both the east and west have argued that religion
often seems contradictory on the surface only because of the inadequacy of human
language to capture the ultimate mystery. Even if this rejoinder is correct, it is not clear
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that Meyers‟ rule can benefit practically from this distinction, for who is to decide which
“contradictions” are only apparent? Meyers, having abandoned externalist and
foundationalist principles, does not have the tools to accomplish such a task, and from
within a believer‟s worldview all “contradictions” are only apparent.
In addition, there are a number of problems with Meyers‟ analysis of his first
case. The elder son cannot only use this confusion over apparent contradictions to his
advantage, he might also provide a sophisticated defense of his beliefs and choices. For
example, he can claim that while God is omnipotent and could heal his mother in spite of
the pain medication, God chooses not to because he desires human obedience, which, in
this case, may include God‟s prohibition of any treatment that might shorten life (under
this view, God would not be a fan of double effect). Moreover, it is possible (at least
Meyers does not rule this out) that the family comes from a traditional culture in which
elder sons are expected to be the “spiritual heads” of families and make hard decisions
even if others in the family disagree with them. If so, then what appears to be
contradictory beliefs on the part of the elder son can be understood as coherent.

Conclusion
Internal consistency is not alone sufficient grounds upon which to decide whether
to honor an M-request, and to require that a surrogate be sufficiently motivated by secular
reasons fails to take religious beliefs seriously enough. Instead, we should (1) allow
surrogates to act on religious motivations, (2) require a reasonable amount of internal
consistency, and (3) determine whether such a request is compatible with moral and
epistemic norms. The third point is probably too “foundationalistic” for Meyers, but if
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there is any hope in holding surrogate M-requests to a high standard, then we may have
to employ a “foundationalistic” normative theory.
Macklin‟s approach is helpful insofar as it rules out ethical relativism, but it also
fails to take religious beliefs seriously enough. Carter and Klugman‟s approach is
instructive and essential for clinical training in patient care and ethics consultations, but it
does not offer a decision-making procedure.
What we need is an approach that takes religious beliefs seriously, giving more
than lip service to respecting matters of conscience. However, we also need an approach
that holds M-requests to a high moral standard. What we need is a phronesis-based
approach.
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CHAPTER FOUR
A Phronesis-Based Approach

A phronesis-based approach is culturally sensitive and can, at the same time, hold
religious beliefs to a high moral standard. In this chapter, I develop such an approach
using Linda Zagzebski‟s Principle of Rational Belief and analyzing the intellectual
virtues. I also provide a set of conditions that caregivers will find useful in clinical case
evaluations.

The Principle of Rational Belief
Linda Zagzebski suggests a principle for evaluating religious beliefs: The
Principle of Rational Belief (PRB), which evaluates beliefs in reference to the phronimos,
the person of practical wisdom. Zagzebski defines PRB as follows:
The Principle of Rational Belief: S‟s belief p in culture C is rational just in case a
person with phronesis outside culture C might believe p if she were in S‟s
circumstances in culture C.121
This principle is in the form of a subjunctive, and it works by asking the question of
specific beliefs: if a rational person were in S‟s shoes, is it possible that the rational
person would believe S‟s belief p? Notice some important aspects of the principle: first,
the holder of the belief (S) need not be fully rational (or virtuous) herself. This would
make the principle too strict since most people fall short of full virtue. Second, the
person with phronesis need not be real; she may merely be an abstract idea. Second,
outside culture C need not mean a member of culture D; again, the virtuous person may
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be a conceptual construct. Finally, the principle says that a person with phronesis might
believe p, not that she would. This makes the principle much weaker, meaning that it is
enough that the belief does not violate epistemic virtues.
Consider the case of a prehistoric man called Cave Man, a Neanderthal who
walked the earth forty thousand years ago (suspend your doubts about whether
Neanderthals had sufficiently developed cognitive capacities to be virtuous). Cave Man
most certainly would have believed that the earth was flat. PRB would classify this belief
as rational if and only if a virtuous person could have arrived at the same belief in the
circumstances. Considering the state of scientific knowledge at the time, it is implausible
to think that a virtuous person would not have believed the earth was flat. A belief in a
flat earth is compatible with simple perception, and in the ancient context, it does not
violate any epistemic norms even if the belief turns out to be false.
Zagzebski grounds PRB on a theory of moral exemplarism, which is a moral
theory in which moral exemplars play a central role. She describes the framework of
such a theory: “[It] defines the evaluative properties of persons, acts, and the outcomes of
acts by reference to the exemplar or exemplars identified by the theory. Good and bad
traits of character are defined in terms of the traits of character of the exemplar. The
moral properties of acts are defined in terms of the actual or hypothetical acts of the
exemplar. Good and bad outcomes are defined in terms of the states of affairs the
exemplar aims to bring about or to prevent.”122

122

Linda Zagzebski, Divine Motivation Theory, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004) 48.

56

The first step in a theory of exemplarism is to identify the exemplar, and this can
be done (and is commonly done) prior to any conceptual analysis of the good.123
Zagzebski says, “The phronimos [moral exemplar or person of practical wisdom] can be
defined, roughly, as a person like that, where we make a demonstrative reference to a
paradigmatically good person.”124 She appeals to Saul Kripke‟s work on natural kinds,
saying that picking out a moral exemplar is like picking out water. We can pick out
something in advance, prior to understanding its nature. In the case of water we say,
“This is water,” and only later learn that water is necessarily H2O. In the same way, we
pick out moral exemplars in the community and only later learn by analysis what
character traits they exemplify. Picking out moral exemplars is logically prior to being
able to explain why they are moral exemplars; Zagzebski says, “I surmise that the move
from “I want to be like R and not like S” to “R is better than S” is not only genetically
primitive, but also basic to moral thinking.”125
She explains that exemplarism, or what she calls an ethics of imitation, fits
naturally with what we know about human psychology. Human behavior, she describes,
is acquired through imitation. From the very earliest stages of development, we imitate
the behavior of others – not only overt behavior, but also attitudes and emotions. In
short, we imitate other people. She says, “The psychology of moral learning suggests
that person exemplars are more basic than act exemplars, because the former are imitated
in more ways than their behavior. Since imitating other persons includes imitating both
123
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their behavior and their emotions, we have a simpler model for understanding human
imitation if we think of the primary objects of imitation as being other persons.”126
Zagzebski‟s theory is influenced by Aristotle, who says that the moral mean is “as
a man of practical wisdom would determine it.”127 In Aristotelian ethics, the phronimos
is the archetype of morality. Aristotle says that a phronimos is the model of right action
and right emotions and feels emotions “at the right times, with reference to the right
objects, towards the right people, with the right motive, and in the right way.”128 A
phronimos exemplifies the virtues of the good life such as courage, honesty and
compassion, living a well-balanced life, avoiding the extremes of both “too much” and
“too little.”
There are a couple of common objections to exemplarism. First, one objection is
that the exemplars we pick out in the world around us often disagree with one another.
However, this problem can be resolved. Zagzebski explains:
Exemplars change, particularly under the influence of other exemplars, but there
would be no reason for them to change if they were perfect. Furthermore, an
exemplar does not have to be perfectly virtuous in order to function satisfactorily
to fix the reference of „good.‟ It is not necessary that our exemplars of water be
pure samples of H2O in order for them to fix the reference of „water,‟ either.129
These real life exemplars allow us to fix our reference, but it is the later realization that
some exemplars have better or more traits than others that drives us to imagine what a
fully virtuous moral exemplar would look like. The limitations of moral exemplars
simply drive us to look beyond and imagine a being like them, but more virtuous.
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The second objection is related to the first. Some think that exemplarism suffers
from a circularity problem: being able to pick out a good person assumes a conception of
the good. Zagzebski‟s response to this is to say that the circularity objection applies only
if moral concepts are basic. Zagzebski writes:
We cannot define everything in a fixed domain using conceptual analysis. Unless
we are willing to accept conceptual circularity, either some moral concept or
concepts will be basic, or the foundation of the theory will refer to something
outside the domain. That means that either something is good in the most basic
way and we cannot expect a defense for its goodness, or the structure of moral
theory rests on something (allegedly) outside of ethics…But if reference to
exemplars of good persons can be incorporated into the foundation of a theory
without going through concepts, then that would permit us to avoid the problems
with a purely conceptual foundation. We have a model for constructing a theory
of this kind in the theory of direct reference.”130
Exemplarism begins with “goodness” in a basic way, by direct reference not concepts, so
it seems impervious to the circularity charge.
Starting with “goodness” in this way might allow us to identify other concepts by
direct reference too, such as a good life. Zagzebski writes: “I have proposed that „good‟
is defined by direct reference. If so, it is plausible that „good life‟ is defined by direct
reference as well. It is a life like that, which is to say that we know it when we see it. It
is a life we want to imitate.”131 In this way, we may also be able to identify concepts like
good belief or good religion.
Some might still respond that Zagzebski‟s reply to the circularity charge is
unsatisfactory because it fails to screen out “exemplars” like Ted Bundy and Adolf Hitler.
Someone might mistakenly pick out bad exemplars, thinking they are good, and a moral
theory ought to prevent such errors. So, a better answer to the circularity charge is to
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base a theory of moral exemplarism on the moral virtues. Under such an approach, a
moral exemplar is one who exemplifies the moral virtues, and the moral virtues are
widely known.
If there is some confusion about or disagreement among moral exemplars, an
analysis or examination of the virtues is required. Rosalind Hursthouse help us
understand how we might apply PRB in practice: “If I acknowledge that I am far from
perfect, and am quite unclear what a virtuous person would do in the circumstances…the
obvious thing to do is to go and ask one, should this be possible.”132 If this is not
possible, she says, the virtues of a virtuous person are known (e.g. open-mindedness,
conscientiousness, intellectual courage etc.), so determining what a rational person might
believe in the circumstances simply requires hypothetical reasoning once the
circumstances are understood. For example, one might ask what an open-minded person
might believe if she were in S‟s circumstances. Open-minded people consider other
points of view, remain tentative when appropriate, and avoid a head-in-the-sand attitude.
Is it possible that a person with such behaviors and attitudes might come to believe S‟s
belief p if she were in S‟s place?
Austin Dacey describes the norms of reason that a rational person would follow:
“honesty, consistency, rationality, evidential support, feasibility, legality, morality, and
revisability.” Dacey unpacks these norms in the following way:
Honesty means we typically say what we really think; rationality, that we take
efficient means to our ends (at least); consistency, that we are prepared to accept
the implications of our views as they apply in other instances; evidence, that it
matters how our reasons link up with the real world (or don‟t); feasibility, that the
132
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proposal is realistic; legality and morality, that it is in accord with our laws and
ethics; and revisability, that we are prepared to entertain objections, criticisms,
and changes.133
These norms of reason are illuminating, but I think they are better conceived of as virtues
(virtues of the mind), as constituents of a philosophical framework that stretches back to
Aristotle‟s virtue ethics.134 Reframing these norms in this way would provide the norms
with a solid foundation and provide many conceptual resources. In addition, this makes it
possible to provide a unifying principle, which should make the standards more
accessible to caregivers. I provide an analysis of intellectual virtues below.
Some people might object that the virtues are culturally relative, so employing
PRB would be impossible because what a virtue is in one culture might not be the same
in another. Take for example “open-mindedness.” In many religious communities, it
seems that open-mindedness is a vice and dogmatic adherence to doctrine (or
faithfulness) is a virtue. This problem is deep and troubling, but not impossible. First, it
is important to note that this is not a difficulty unique to this principle; every ethical
theory must attempt to handle the divergences in moral judgments across people and
cultures. Second, some virtues are essential to the proper functioning and survival of
society – honesty, for example. James Rachels argues that truth-telling is essential to any
complex society. If a society does not value honesty, then there would be no reason to
trust what anyone says; communication and social functioning would break down.135
Similar arguments can be made for the virtues of fidelity and reverence for life. Third,
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rationality is an attribute of humanity, not a concept that is restricted to localized
traditions. If it were the case that the concept of rationality had no objective sense to it,
then it is questionable whether we could discover anything objective in the world –
whether we could ever escape our own particular “language games.” In arguing for the
transcendence of rationality, Zagzebski says,
Whatever rationality is, it is something all humans share… What is rational is in
principle recognizably rational by all rational beings, which means all humans,
even those outside one‟s cultural community. To be rational is to be able to talk to
other persons and to make oneself understood, no matter who those persons are.
This is the sense in which rationality is transcendent. It is what permits us to
communicate with one another and to form a human community that transcends
the individual communities we inhabit.136
Rationality is an attribute that is deeply connected to our being human – a defining
characteristic38 even if we fail to be fully rational. Therefore, even if background beliefs
vary from time and place, moral and intellectual virtues do not.
Another difficulty involves defining a culture for the purposes of employing the
Principle. Is a culture to be thought of as a large community such as North America or
might it be defined more narrowly such as a group of JWs in North America? I think the
concept of culture is flexible here. Adopting a broader definition of culture would
complicate PRB because of the sheer number of background beliefs that would need to be
considered; nevertheless, the number of virtues remain the same whether the culture is
small or large. In some cases, choosing the size of the culture could affect the outcome
of the PRB procedure. For example, if the culture is limited to the Yearning For Zion
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compound in Texas,137 then the impoverishment of background beliefs of that community
would most certainly affect what a virtuous person would believe. However, if it is
doubtful that a phronimos would ever lock herself up in such a compound, then it is hard
to see how any of the beliefs of the members of that community could ever qualify as
rational. Depending on the case, it might be important to employ multiple (broader)
conceptions of a patient‟s culture before reaching a conclusion.
PRB is compatible with what Zagzebski calls The Culture Sensitivity Principle,
which is one of three principles of rationality she says constrain how diversity should be
treated:
The Culture Sensitivity Principle: Persons should treat the members of other
cultures and religions as though they were prima facie as rational as
themselves.138
The principle constitutes a check against the tendency to conclude that cultural beliefs
that are different from one‟s own are, on the basis of that fact alone, irrational.
Nevertheless, the Culture Sensitivity Principle does not rule out a determination that
beliefs in other cultures are irrational; in other words, it is possible to be discriminating
and remain culturally sensitive. What matters is the procedure one uses to arrive at such
a judgment.
In addition, PRB is culturally sensitive because it defines rationality in terms of
process, not content. Defining rationality in terms of process means to say that it is the
procedure that matters, not the end result. In other words, whatever beliefs are acquired
through a rational process are to that extent rational; there is no set of universally137
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recognized irrational beliefs, the believing of which, apart from any investigation,
automatically disqualifies the believer. For example, to the extent to which a belief in
reincarnation is the result of an act of intellectual virtue, it is to that extent rational. Also,
to the extent to which a belief in the possibility of miracles is the result of an act of
intellectual virtue, it is to that extent rational. The alternative – defining rationality in
terms of the content of the belief – is dangerous because of the tendency to impose on
others, as the standard of rationality, the particular beliefs of the dominant culture. For
example, a westerner is not likely to believe in the power of deceased ancestors to affect
the lives of the living, and she will likely dismiss Chinese ancestral worship as irrational.
But this is just a form of cultural imperialism, one that we might call cultural epistemic
imperialism. PRB naturally recognizes that phronimoi arrive at beliefs via acts of
intellectual virtue and that possibly there are phronimoi in every culture, so it is
ineffective and insensitive to make a list of particular irrational beliefs without first
considering whether the beliefs might be acquired through an act of intellectual virtue in
a different culture.

Intellectual Virtues
Zagzebski defines intellectual virtue as follows: “a deep and enduring acquired
excellence of a person, involving a characteristic motivation to produce a certain desired
end and reliable success in bringing about that end.”139 The list of intellectual virtues
includes intellectual courage, caution, and open-mindedness – traits that are widely
desired and recognized as being successful in acquiring truth.
139
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Zagzebski distinguishes between a virtue and an act of virtue. Her definition of
an act of intellectual virtue is as follows: “An act of intellectual virtue A is an act that
arises from the motivational component of A, is something a person with virtue A would
(probably) do in the circumstances, is successful in achieving the end of the A
motivation, and is such that the agent acquires a true belief (cognitive contact with
reality) through these features of the act.”140 According to this definition, an act of
intellectual virtue has three components: a motivational, procedural and success
component. For example, an act of open-mindedness will have truth acquisition as a
motivation, will follow typical procedures (such as listening to the views of others), and
will result in the acquisition of a true belief. Distinguishing between a virtue and an act
of virtue allows for the possibility that a person‟s actions might be appraised as virtuous
without the person herself having a fully virtuous character.
Zagzebski‟s “success component” of the definition of an intellectual virtue is
problematic, and it is ad hoc insofar as it is primarily meant to solve Gettier problems,
even though she claims otherwise. In Part III of Virtues of the Mind, Linda Zagzebski
offers a definition of knowledge that she claims is immune to Gettier problems:
“Knowledge is a state of cognitive contact with reality arising from acts of intellectual
virtue.”141 She claims that this definition is better than rival analyses of knowledge
because it defines knowledge in a way that is not ad hoc. For example, she notes that one
way to answer Gettier cases and save the traditional analysis of knowledge is by defining
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knowledge as “nonaccidentally true belief.”142 However, she argues that this definition
of knowledge falls short because the definition “nonaccidentally true belief” is something
only a philosopher would have thought of who was familiar with Gettier cases. She says,
“a good definition should be formulated in such a way that it does not contain features
whose sole advantage is to answer counterexamples.”143 She says, “What I tried to do
with the concept of an act of intellectual virtue was to propose a concept of a kind of act
that gets everything right. It is general enough that it applies to overt acts, not just
cognitive acts, and it is a concept we would want anyway, even if nobody had ever
thought of [Gettier] cases.”144 Every definition of knowledge that is formulated as true
belief plus something (where the “something” does not entail truth) is vulnerable to
Gettier problems.145 Zagzebski‟s success component attempts to close the gap between
true belief and knowledge, and her definition of knowledge – cognitive contact with
reality arising from acts of intellectual virtue – avoids Gettier problems, she claims,
because unlike other “true belief plus something” formulae, it does not leave room for
error.
However, while her definition of knowledge seems to have clear advantages, I am
not sure it is entirely successful, for it depends on the success component, which seems
dubious. An act of intellectual virtue of, say, open-mindedness is still an act of virtue
even if it does not succeed in reaching its aim, the truth. Ought we to criticize someone
who acts as conscientiously as a fully virtuous agent would, but fails to get the truth? We
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can imagine a situation (one that is fairly common) where the acquisition of knowledge is
simply too difficult even for someone who acts thus – the circumstances conspire against
our conscientious agent and she simply fails to acquire knowledge. Nevertheless, we
would still praise her actions as virtuous.
Zagzebski recognizes this concern, acknowledging that our agent‟s actions would
be praiseworthy but simply not fully virtuous. She writes,
Even when an act is motivated properly and is what a virtuous person would
characteristically do in the circumstances, it may fail in the aim of the act. When
this happens the act lacks something morally desirable [namely moral luck] … for
example, a person might be motivated by generosity and act in a way
characteristic of generous persons in some particular circumstance[s], say by
giving money to a beggar on the street, but if it turns out that the beggar is really
rich and is playing the part of a beggar to win a bet, we would think that there is
something morally lacking in the act…her act would not merit the degree of
praise due it if the beggar were really deserving. The same point applies to
intellectual acts. A person may be motivated by intellectual virtues and act in a
way intellectually virtuous persons characteristically act in attempting to get
knowledge, but if she fails to get the truth, her epistemic state is lacking
something praiseworthy. This means there is a kind of epistemic luck analogous
to moral luck.146
I think Zagzebski is partly wrong here. Although it is clear that luck has a part to
play, this need not take away from the praiseworthiness of the agent‟s act. It is
unfortunate that our agent‟s hard work does not pay off, but this is simply unfortunate,
not something lacking on the agent‟s part.147 The virtuousness of the act is independent
of the act‟s outcome. Robert C. Roberts and W. Jay Wood agree: “From the fact that I
performed an act of generosity, it does not follow that I actually helped anybody…The
same is true of intellectual virtues. A person can perform acts of open-mindedness, of
146
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diligence in investigations, of charity in his interpretations of others‟ views, of honesty
with himself and with others, and still not hit on the truth.”148
Roberts and Wood also suggest that her definition is ad hoc. They think that it is
artificially tailored to avoid Gettier problems because “the infallibility of acts of virtue
presupposed by her definition of knowledge is not a noticeable part of [the history of
philosophy], or of ordinary people‟s use of „virtue‟; her particular twist on the concept of
an act of virtue seems specially tailored for closing the gap between justification and
truth.”149
Thus, I propose that Zagzebski abandon the success component of her definition
of an act of virtue. Her definition of knowledge would still be formulated as “cognitive
contact with reality arising from acts of intellectual virtue (but where acts of virtue do not
guarantee truth).” However, if the success component is dropped, then she loses the
ability to answer Gettier problems, which may not be so bad anyways. At most, this
would put her theory on par with the many others, but would not necessarily undermine
it. Zagzebski‟s definition of knowledge has other strengths that rival theories lack, for
example relating the traits of an agent‟s character to the acquisition of knowledge, and
that is commendable.
In Intellectual Virtues: An Essay in Regulative Epistemology, Roberts and Wood
present a guide for epistemic practice, steering epistemology away from the standard
debates, such as the definition of knowledge – debates which they think have ended in
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paralysis.150 Regulative epistemology, as they call it, is more fruitful than the standard
analytic type. Regulative epistemology “is a response to perceived deficiencies in
people‟s epistemic conduct, and thus is strongly practical and social, rather than just an
interesting theoretical challenge for philosophy professors and smart students. This kind
of epistemology aims to change the (social) world.”151 Roberts and Wood follow in the
footsteps of John Locke, who in his Of the Conduct of the Understanding describes the
personal dispositions and habits of mind of a rational person. This Lockean kind of
virtue analysis is the role that Roberts and Wood take on in Part II of their book,
describing in detail a series of intellectual virtues: love of knowledge, firmness, courage
and caution, humility, autonomy, generosity, and practical wisdom. In the pages that
follow, I will explore and expand on their analysis of these virtues because I think such
an examination is necessary in order to apply the Principle of Rational Belief effectively.

The Love of Knowledge
First, the love of knowledge is a virtue that is based on the innate human desire to
know. Children come into the world with this desire, but it must mature and grow,
becoming a refined, excellent character trait. For one, it is not enough to have an
indiscriminate love of knowledge; some kinds of knowledge are more valuable than other
kinds. For example, one could memorize random facts in a phone book, or one could set
about the more admirable task of learning the properties of the HIV virus in order to find
a cure. Roberts and Wood explain that some cases of knowledge are more worthy than
others in virtue of their connection to human flourishing (the extent to which they
150
151

Roberts and Wood, 20.
Roberts and Wood, 21.

69

advance human well-being) and that some objects of knowledge have intrinsic
importance. Also, some cases of knowledge bear a greater epistemic weight than others
by supporting other beliefs. Moreover, some knowledge may not be as important to one
agent as it is to another. For example, the knowledge of how to feed my family is more
relevant to me than it is to you.152
Roberts and Wood explain that the love of knowledge should translate to the
purveyance of knowledge because knowledge is a social affair. People who love
knowledge are motivated to see others love knowledge and acquire it.153 Roberts and
Wood say, “Here the love of knowledge is not just a love of epistemic goods as such, but
of other people‟s having them. So what we would ordinarily call a moral motivation is
involved in the structure of the virtue…but the virtue is intellectual inasmuch as the good
or the justice that is wished for the other is an epistemic one.”154 The love of knowledge
in this sense might be called intellectual generosity.
Roberts and Wood describe a number of ways that people can fall short of the
love of knowledge. First, they might fail to have a concern for knowledge, otherwise
known as epistemic complacency.155 Consider the following examples: they may decline
opportunities to test their beliefs; they may become discouraged with the amount of effort
that is required to acquire knowledge; they may shield themselves from hurtful selfknowledge; and academically, they may avoid anomalies that could disconfirm their
theories (as in science). The solution for this kind of complacency is an education that

152

Roberts and Wood, 156-164.
Roberts and Wood, 164.
154
Roberts and Wood, 165.
155
Roberts and Wood, 170-172.
153

70

treats the truth as an intrinsic good, not just a good useful for passing a course or
protecting a religious dogma.
Second, they might have an unvirtuous concern for knowledge. For example,
desiring knowledge solely for instrumental reasons can be unvirtuous (but not always).
Roberts and Wood explain: “If a piece of knowledge merits a Nobel prize, one who
desires that knowledge only for the Prize has a defective epistemic will.”156 An example
in which instrumental knowledge could be virtuous is in the case of biological knowledge
being used instrumentally for its medical applications. Gossip is another example of a
kind of knowledge that only unvirtuous people are concerned with. Even if the gossip is
not found to be harmful to someone else, it is by its nature a violation of privacy. Roberts
and Wood say, “The gossiper exhibits a deficit of circumspection, of seriousness about
the question: Is this something I, in my circumstances, am permitted to learn, or to pass
on to this other in his circumstances?”157
Third, they might fail to have a concern not to know. A gossiper is a
straightforward example of this, as seen above; a gossiper fails in this concern. However,
we can also see examples of this with cases of higher-order knowledge. For example, a
scientist may have the desire to unlock the mysteries of human cloning and may be on the
verge of doing so, but she may realize that she herself and modern society would not be
able to handle such knowledge.158 She would be faced with the question of whether the
good of the potential knowledge would be outweighed by the potential for evil. This is a
difficult question, one that would be best answered by a phronimos. Assuming that the
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scientist is right about the fact that this knowledge would not be handled correctly, it
seems the appropriate concern to have here would be the concern not to acquire the
cloning knowledge.

Firmness
It is natural and right to hold firmly to beliefs; in fact, having beliefs at all implies
a certain amount of firmness about something. If I believe that I see a big truck coming
at me, I am committed, in some sense, to the truth of that belief. If I believe that eating
fast food every day is unhealthy, then I am committed to the falsehood of the proposition
that eating it every day is healthy. It would be impossible to believe anything if a certain
amount of firmness were not an essential part of belief. Thomas Kuhn discusses firmness
in science, that scientists are justified in holding onto a theory even in the presence of
anomalies.159 In fact, a scientist who worries about every anomaly cannot do good
science. Kuhn says, “The scientist who pauses to examine every anomaly he notes will
seldom get significant work done.”160
Roberts and Wood describe firmness as an Aristotelian virtue, as a mean between
two extremes. It is not necessarily the midpoint between holding beliefs too loosely or
tightly; there are probably a range of possibilities in the middle depending on the
circumstances.161
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People who do not hold beliefs firmly are thought to be intellectually flabby. 162
An example of this kind of flabbiness is someone who believes whatever is popular at the
moment among her peers. This flabby person changes her mind whenever her peers do,
not on the basis of good evidence, but simply because the beliefs she held before are no
longer popular. Skeptics are also in violation of the virtue of firmness. Skeptics are
worried about being too rigid and about the negative consequences of being mistaken, so
they withhold their belief. Roberts and Wood explain: “The skeptic aims to be
invulnerable by virtue of flexing with the storm vicissitudes, by going with the flow and
riding the waves, like seaweed or fish. So the perfect graduate of skeptical therapy just
goes with the flow of his desires as they arise in response to the impressions that he
receives from his environment.”163
Nevertheless, hyper-firmness is also a danger. Roberts and Wood call this
“rigidity” or being “too stiff.” They describe five kinds of rigidity.164 First, there is
dogmatism, which is “a disposition to respond irrationally to oppositions to the belief:
anomalies, objections, evidence to the contrary, counterexamples, and the like.”165 This
irrationality manifests in an unwillingness to listen to other opinions or consider
counterarguments. Second, there is doxastic complacency, which is a laziness that
manifests in a determination to stick with one‟s beliefs because doing otherwise would
require too much work or research. Third, there is stolid perseverance, which is an
overly-tenacious holding onto an epistemic goal when it would be more reasonable to
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give it up or modify it. Fourth, there is perceptual rigidity, which is the condition that
arises when an individual is so committed to her beliefs that she cannot even recognize
things that would count against them. Finally, there is comprehensional rigidity, which is
the inability to understand conceptual frameworks other than one‟s own.

Courage and Caution
The virtues of courage and caution are complementary, related as they are to fear.
Roberts and Wood explain: “Both virtues are dispositions with respect to fear, though
they are differently related to it. If courage is a disposition to mitigate, circumvent, or
transcend fears, caution is a disposition to cultivate, refine, and listen to one‟s fears.”166
Caution might be called “appropriate fear” in that it considers real problems that might
threaten one‟s epistemic situation. Courage refers to the strength needed to protect or
improve one‟s situation. In some cases, caution will be called for, in others, courage.
Courage is both a moral and epistemic virtue, but as the latter it is related to the
love of knowledge. Intellectual cowardice is an inadequate love of knowledge.
Knowledge acquisition can often be painful. It might require opening one‟s most
cherished beliefs to criticism, and it might result in a difficult transformation of one‟s
identity. Roberts and Wood show how cowardice can manifest in academic departments.
For one, a department might choose not to hire an applicant whose research or
intelligence might threaten to upend the prized research or intelligence of others in the
department. In such a case, pride or fear is given preference over the love of knowledge.
Academicians may give in to fear in other ways too; consider the following example: “A
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philosopher so scrupulous about protecting himself against refutation that he convolutes
his formulas with multiple and involved qualifications that render his written and spoken
discourse a monstrosity of vacuous and incomprehensible ass-covering.”167
A person of courage is also a person of caution when appropriate. To lack caution
is to be reckless. A reckless love of knowledge is one in which knowledge is pursued
relentlessly without concern for the consequences on other individuals, communities, or
societies. Roberts and Wood explore this phenomenon in the context of Shakespeare‟s
Othello.168 Literary critics have speculated as to the motivation Iago might have in
arousing Othello‟s jealousy toward Desdemona. One critic has suggested that Iago may
be motivated simply by a desire to know how Othello would react under certain
conditions and stresses. Hence, this critic suggests that since knowledge acquisition is
good for its own sake, Iago‟s actions are morally acceptable. Nevertheless, the case of
Othello shows that knowledge acquisition can be destructive (destroying both Othello
and Desdemona), so it should be pursued with caution.
On the other hand, while caution is good, one can be overly cautious. Roberts and
Woods call this “scrupulosity.”169 This vice is present when an individual is afraid of
taking risks; she is unable to judge when taking risks are appropriate. Roberts and Wood
think that W. K. Clifford‟s “The Ethics of Belief” essay is an example of scrupulosity.170
In it, Clifford argues that it is wrong to ever believe something on insufficient evidence
lest, as in his ship-owner thought experiment, horrible things happen. Clifford‟s ship-
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owner may not have been cautious enough, but Clifford thinks that even drunk drivel in a
village alehouse should be held to this high standard lest society “shrinks back into
savagery.”171 Roberts and Wood argue that Clifford‟s high demands are unrealistic.
Such a high degree of certainty is impossible and not even desirable. They say, “The
person who is virtuously cautious…knows that the ship must eventually sail, and that
Cartesian certainty is not available in the case. He knows that religious beliefs are not
susceptible to the same kind of testing as a ship‟s seaworthiness, and that if one is to reap
the benefits of religious life one must (with courage) venture out with faith.”172
Faith requires courage, and religious believers often exemplify such a virtue.
However, the most common concern is that believers are not cautious enough (hence,
lacking true courage), believing indiscriminately whatever their particular religion
teaches. The victims of the Jonestown tragedy might have escaped their fate if they
would have showed a little more caution and skepticism about the character of Jim Jones.
A properly cautious or courageous religious believer will know when faith is appropriate
and when it is better to withhold belief. This virtue is closely connected with the virtue
of autonomy, which I will explore below.

Humility
Intellectual humility is the disposition to evaluate one‟s intelligence or intellectual
accomplishments properly. It might seem that humility means to have a low estimation
of oneself, but such a definition would make it impossible for unusually intelligent
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individuals to be virtuous. Instead, the virtue of humility is better located between the
vices of having too high and too low an evaluation of oneself. It is to have in mind one‟s
human and limited epistemic condition, but also to realize one‟s intellectual
accomplishments.
Roberts and Wood show how the virtue of intellectual humility is contrasted with
the vices of vanity and arrogance.173 They describe the intellectually vain person as one
who is too concerned with impressing others or looking smart. They say, “The lack of
concern to look good frees the intellectually humble person to pursue intellectual goods
simply and undistractedly…the humble person will be free to test his ideas against the
strongest objections. His humility may also make for intellectual adventure: he will not
be afraid to try out ideas that others may ridicule.”174 The intellectually arrogant person
is one who thinks his intelligence exempts him from considering other points of view.
He feels that he does not need to listen to others because of his “privileged epistemic
position,” which in fact is an illusion or ought to be tempered by the realization that no
person or position (besides God) has a monopoly on knowledge. Roberts and Wood
point out that humility is more conducive to knowledge acquisition because “the humble
inquirer has more potential teachers than his less humble counterparts.”175
Intellectual humility may seem to be synonymous with the virtue of openmindedness, and certainly, the two are connected in some ways. However, as James
Spiegel points out, “One can be open-minded about particular issues (e.g. whether the
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salmon season should be extended) while lacking intellectual humility as a general
epistemic trait.”176
Is intellectual humility compatible with religious devotion? Religion often seems
to be the very antithesis of humility insofar as it makes claims to specially privileged
divine knowledge and authority. While there clearly are examples of arrogance in
religion (as there are in any domain), it does not seem to be a necessary ingredient. In
fact, there are many religious texts that enjoin their readers to live humbly. For example,
James 4:10 (NIV) says, “Humble yourselves before the Lord” and Philippians 2:3 says,
“Do nothing out of selfish ambition or vain conceit, but in humility consider others better
than yourselves.” Nevertheless, some might think that humility entails doubt, and
believers are not supposed to doubt, which is the opposite of faith. However, it not clear
that doubt and faith are entirely opposed. For example, consider the life of Mother
Teresa. In her posthumously published writings, it has become clear that she was
plagued by doubts about God.177 Nevertheless, she still is the model of religious
devotion, if there ever was one. No, intellectual humility does not preclude religious
convictions. If it did, it would likely preclude the holding of beliefs in any domain.
What it does preclude is holding beliefs with such certainty that the believer ceases to
listen to others.
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Autonomy
Autonomy means “self-governing,” which means being your own person.
Beauchamp and Childress describe the moral virtue of autonomy in terms of agents who
act “(1) intentionally, (2) with understanding, and (3) without controlling influences that
determine their action.”178 The intellectual virtue of autonomy is the ability and
willingness to think for oneself when appropriate. The corresponding vice is called
“heteronomy,” which means being regulated by others when one should be regulating
oneself.
The virtue of autonomy does not preclude being regulated by others when
appropriate; in fact, it is often necessary, but Roberts and Wood describe an example of
someone who is hyper-autonomous.179 Such a person never relies on others, never
submits to the teaching of another, and always insists that she discover the truth on her
own. Such a person would lack knowledge in important ways, never trusting sources of
information that are trustworthy. Roberts and Wood describe when “hetero-regulation” is
appropriate such as in learning from experts in a particular field, or submitting one‟s own
thoughts to the criticism of others, or in modeling one‟s thinking after one‟s mentors.180
On the other hand, it is easy to think of examples of people who are overly
regulated by others. Roberts and Wood describe such a thinker in the following way:
When he follows a rule of inference, he must not only have the rule dictated to
him by some authority…but he must have guidance in how to apply the rule to the
present case…When he does an experiment, he must be guided at every step by
his research director. He never “plays” with vocabulary, but must be able to find
exactly the required meaning in a dictionary, and regularly needs confirmation by
178
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a teacher that the meaning he thinks he has found is indeed the required
meaning…He takes course after course in the university, collecting notebooks full
of lecture dictation that he duly memorizes, but never ventures to put any of the
ideas together in his own way.181
Such a thinker may benefit from the knowledge of others, but he fails to make much use
of it. He may be regulated by others out of fear of being wrong, but more likely he is so
because he has never learned to think for himself.
Roberts and Wood entertain the question whether religious people can submit
themselves to a religious authority, or a hetero-regulator, and still be considered
autonomous.182 For example, Christians believe the Bible is authoritative and submit to
its teachings; some would consider this vicious heteronomy. Roberts and Woods explain,
as above, that no one is (or should be) completely autonomous. As they put it,
“Autonomy is an ability to resist improper hetero-regulators,”183 and they say,
“[Autonomy] is a disposition and ability to resist some hetero-regulators by virtue of
obedience to another hetero-regulator.”184 However, autonomy in this sense, say Roberts
and Wood, is autonomy in the true sense to the extent that it is a matter of standing on
one‟s own two feet.185 In other words, autonomous individuals submit to a heteroregulator, but understand why they are doing so. Autonomy is not blind. In addition,
when the pressure from multiple, conflicting hetero-regulators is great, the opportunities
to grow in autonomy increase because individuals are faced with choices and are given
the chance to reflect on the reasons for choosing one hetero-regulator over another.
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Submission to a hetero-regulator comes in degrees. Glenn Graber says, “I may trust my
priest‟s interpretation of scripture – but I will still sort through my own reactions to what
he says; and if he says something that I find harder to accept, I may at least modulate the
strength of my belief to reflect the degree of my doubt. My default position may be to
accept what he says, but that default can be overridden.”186
Autonomous adherence to a hetero-regulator is not merely deference to an
authority, but it is also “understanding in terms of the hetero-regulator.”187 This means
that the autonomous individual will not only believe what the hetero-regulator believes,
but also understand what the conflicting points of views are as understood by his
preferred religious authority and as understood by the hetero-regulator being resisted.
This requires intellectual courage and critical reflection. Autonomous adherence also
requires a deep appropriation of the beliefs of the hetero-regulator so that the beliefs
become a part of the self. Roberts and Wood explain: “To think in terms of a heteroregulator is to love in terms of the hetero-regulator, to care, to be concerned, to be
emotionally involved in those terms…Sometimes autonomy has been thought of as
disinterested…but on the present analysis, autonomy is not a property of the intellect as a
faculty or part of a person, but a property of the thinker, the epistemic agent.”188
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A Set of Conditions for Clinical Case Evaluations189
While the PRB and the above analysis of intellectual virtues provide the
normative basis for judging which religious beliefs and M-requests should be honored in
the clinic, caregivers might find more helpful a set of conditions that are more concrete.
James Buryska proposes the following set of principles to determine which M-requests to
honor: A request is more defensible if (1) it does not violate a physician‟s conscience, (2)
it is based on negative rights, not positive ones, (3) it is grounded in a community, and (4)
it is made by one willing to accept the burden of responsibility.190 These principles are
instructive and illuminating, but some of them are more helpful than others. For
example, the community principle – verifying that a belief is based in the teachings of a
community – seems to be a necessary condition (I say more about this below), but
consideration of a physician‟s conscience seems less important because such conflict is
inevitable if these requests violate the standard of care by definition (if requests are not
“inappropriate,” then it is a non-issue). Space does not permit me to critique Buryska‟s
principles in detail. Instead, I will propose a different set of conditions that I feel are
more useful in the clinic, called MVRB conditions hereafter:191
1.
2.
3.
4.

The belief is shared by a community.
The belief is deeply held.
The belief would pass the test of a religious interpreter.
The belief does not harm others.
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These conditions are not simply pass/fail; assessment can fall on a spectrum from
“satisfies” or “mostly satisfies” to “fails” or “mostly fails to satisfy.” The more
conditions satisfied, the more weight ought to be given to the religious belief. The fewer
conditions satisfied, the less consideration it receives.

The Conditions
1. The belief is shared by a community
Michael Wreen suggests this condition, saying that values that transcend the
individual carry more weight than ones that are based on idiosyncratic choices. 192 He
compares a person who refuses lifesaving treatment on the basis of a traditional religious
belief and one who does so because he flipped a coin to decide his fate. It seems absurd
to assign the same weight to the two requests even if coin-flipping carries deep
metaphysical significance to the patient.
Still, one could object that community matters less than existential import; in
other words, religious beliefs are as various and unique as the people who hold them, and
whether they are peculiar or not does not affect how deeply held they are or nullify the
“integrating and reconciling” function they play. This is, I take it, part of the motivation
behind Julian Savulescu‟s criticism of Robert Orr and Leigh Genesen‟s paper, “Requests
for „Inappropriate‟ Treatment Based on Religious Beliefs,” namely that atheists (whose
community may not be clearly defined) are discriminated against.193
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However, religious beliefs that are held by many do seem to have greater weight
than beliefs that are held by a lone maverick for the following reasons: first, even though
the maverick‟s personal religious convictions might be carefully thought out and deeply
held, this individual does not benefit from the epistemic resources available in the
community such as a division of labor, a wealth of experts, and a long tradition. Second,
a benefit of community is found in peer accountability, the regular subjection of one‟s
beliefs to scrutiny, which helps to eliminate aberrant and anti-social beliefs.194 Third,
John Hardwig argues that there are many things that we cannot know if we are
independent and self-reliant; our knowledge naturally depends on communities of trust
relationships.195 Finally, Buryska explains that a community provides “a supportive
structure of psychic and physical resources” that helps individuals make choices that they
would otherwise be incapable of.196
The size of the community is relevant here too. If the religious belief has few
adherents, this should count against the belief; if the belief is a constituent of one of the
world‟s great religions, this counts in its favor. Some would argue that this rules out the
beliefs of religious reformers, such as Buddha or Jesus, because their communities have
few members at the time the movement begins. However, reformers often identify to
some extent with the community they are attempting to reform. The Buddha, in his day,
could have been identified as part of Hindu culture; and Jesus was part of the Jewish
194
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community. To the extent that their beliefs are similar to their background cultures, they
would satisfy this criterion. Nevertheless, what makes reformers unique in their contexts
is that they hold a number of different beliefs; and if it is these beliefs upon which a
medical request is made, then the reformer fares poorly. I see no practical way of
avoiding this outcome: a few saints may not get the medical care they deserve. But I am
not too concerned about ultimate justice here, nor do I think I should be. What I am
suggesting is that sharing a religious belief with a larger community makes the belief,
prima facie, more virtuous – and thus more relevant to the medical establishment than
idiosyncratic beliefs. A few admirable reformers might be left out, but if our medical
practice recognizes a large number of mainstream religious beliefs, then I think the cost is
worth it. At any rate, scoring low on this condition (having a small community) does not
automatically disqualify a treatment request because there are other factors to consider.
A figure like the Buddha would likely pass the other conditions below with flying colors,
so the reformer objection carries little weight.
This community condition is tied to the virtue of autonomy. As mentioned
earlier, proper autonomy does not preclude being regulated by others when appropriate,
and hetero-regulation is often necessary; otherwise, we would lack knowledge in
important ways.

2. The belief is deeply held
Orr and Genesen argue that it is not enough that the belief in question is widely
held; it must also be deeply held: “What makes religious values „special‟ is not only that
they are shared by a community, but more importantly, that they are incorporated by the
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individual into his or her persona. Religious values are thus more intrinsic than [many]
other shared values because they deal with the very meaning of life.”197 This would rule
out beliefs that are mere cultural baggage. For example, people who think that because
they were born in East Tennessee they must be Christian are simply carrying the label,
especially if Christian doctrine has little impact on their deeper sense of identity.
As Wreen points out, some people hold the most peculiar and trivial beliefs.
Someone might for example have a belief in red objects, that the world would be a better
place if these objects were maximized.198 Nevertheless, Wreen suggests that these beliefs
do not carry the same weight because (1) religious values are more important to people,
(2) the U.S. Constitution does not provide special protection for red object beliefs, (3)
religious beliefs are not clearly true or false while beliefs about red objects are, and (4)
religious beliefs fit into a rational person‟s life in the way beliefs about red objects
cannot, namely they describe the human condition, provide a person with a sense of
identity, and make sense of the world.199
However, it appears as a matter of empirical fact that trivial beliefs are often held
in the same manner as traditional religious beliefs. Moreover, some would still say they
see no real difference between the merits of deeply believing apparently trivial things and
believing in religion. “Whatever does it for you,” one might say: “Worshiping God or
rebuilding old Mustangs.” To the former claim, I concede. Certainly, it is cognitively
possible to hold beliefs about trivial things in a deep way, but so what? We should
ascribe a certain level of consideration to any belief just because it is deeply held –
197
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whether it is in red objects or in restoring old cars – but this does not mean that all deeply
held beliefs are equal. To say that there is no real difference between trivial and religious
beliefs seems clearly false. Religion – with its literature, rituals and saints – has played a
central and sacred role in human society since the beginning, a role that is only poorly
fulfilled by ordinary activities. Huston Smith says, “The finitude of mundane existence
cannot satisfy the human heart completely. Built into the human makeup is a longing for
„more‟ that the world of everyday experience cannot requite.”200 So, even if trivial
beliefs can be deeply held, there is something about the human experience that such
beliefs fail to capture.
Another concern is that it would be too difficult for a caregiver to separate out, in
practice, those who hold their religion deeply from those who do not.201 For example, a
patient may profess to be a Christian, but only to satisfy her family. How can we
distinguish these patients from other more or less committed Christians? I grant that this
is a problem for applying my criteria, but if it is devastating, it is not uniquely destructive
to my project alone, for often physicians have no other recourse in making tough medical
decisions than to trust the testimony of the patient or make their best judgment. This is
the case, for example, in trying to decide whether a surrogate is acting out of the best
interest of the patient – the problem is one of judging psychological factors or moral
character.
The “deeply held” condition is tied to the virtues of firmness and autonomy. A
believer who exemplifies the virtue of firmness will hold her beliefs deeply. She will be
200

Huston Smith, Why Religion Matters: the Fate of the Human Spirit in an Age of Disbelief (New York:
HarperCollins, 2001) 3.
201
Thanks to John Hardwig for this insight.

87

firm, but not rigid. She will be firm, but not intellectually flabby. Shallow believers are
often dogmatic or too easily swayed. The condition is also tied to autonomy insofar as
autonomy involves a deep appropriation of the beliefs in question, a deep appropriation
of the beliefs of the hetero-regulator.

3. The belief would pass the test of a religious interpreter
Orr and Genesen suggest involving a religious interpreter when no one on the
care-giving team is familiar with the religion of the patient.202 The interpreter could
fulfill many responsibilities including the following: (1) a support for the patient and the
family, (2) someone to help articulate the patient‟s belief to the physician, and (3)
someone to help articulate the physician‟s point of view to the patient.
The responsibilities of a religious interpreter could be fulfilled by a hospital
chaplain or social worker, who – in either case – is familiar with the particular religion or
a wide variety of traditions. The interpreter might also be the patient‟s own pastor, priest,
or advisor as long as this individual is able and willing to communicate with hospital
staff. In rare cases when there are no local representatives of the religion, the caregivers
may need to call on a religious studies professor from a local college who has spent time
studying sects similar to the patient‟s.
As an interpreter, the individual would play the mediating role of third party to a
conflict, which provides an objective neutral ground from which to facilitate productive
communication. This role has already been used successfully in cultural and political
contexts and is also employed to solve interpersonal conflicts such as in marriage.
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Surely, it would work in this situation as well. In addition, the interpreter might assist in
evaluating whether the patient fully understands the situation, whether the belief is shared
by a community, and whether it is deeply held (assisting the caregiver in employing the
other criteria). Moreover, the interpreter would be in the best position to evaluate
whether the patient‟s belief was recently acquired or whether it is a long-held conviction.
Orr and Genesen describe cases of “fox-hole religion,” which are similar to deathbed
conversions in that they occur under great stress. It is implied that a long-held belief
carries more weight than one that is adopted under duress, the former type is one that is
more likely to fulfill the functions Wreen describes.
One worry is whether being a practitioner of the religion makes an interpreter
better or worse; would religious devotion negatively affect one‟s ability to fulfill these
responsibilities? I think this is a valid concern, but religious devotion (or non-devotion)
should not automatically disqualify an interpreter. It is possible that religious
commitment might make mediation too difficult, but it is also possible to be too
objective, failing to really understand the point of view of the religious believer. Both
parties (especially the physicians who are charged with carrying out a treatment request)
must evaluate each interpreter anew to decide whether he or she can act effectively.
Obviously, the position of a religious interpreter requires a certain amount of objectivity
and open-mindedness in order to listen successfully, but simply adhering to a religion
does not make this impossible any more than it does for a cultural translator who
identifies more closely with one culture and language over another.
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The religious interpreter condition is tied to the virtues of the love of knowledge,
humility, and autonomy. From the point of view of the caregivers, there should be a
desire to know and understand how the patient interprets her situation. The patient must
also shoulder some of this responsibility, and an interpreter can help both parties. The
condition is also tied to the virtue of humility. The act of bringing in a third party
acknowledges the need for help in both understanding and communication. It is also
related to autonomy insofar as it is an example of the appropriate submission to a heteroregulator. For example, if the interpreter is a leader in the patient‟s community and
contradicts the patient‟s interpretation of her situation, then it may be appropriate to
submit to him.

4. The belief does not harm others
A physician‟s prima facie duty is to “do no harm.” A request for “inappropriate”
treatment may result in harm to the patient and others, so it is necessary to reflect on how
much harm we would be willing to permit in the name of autonomy and religious
freedom.
First, there is harm to the self, which may make little sense from an outsider‟s
perspective, but we ought to acknowledge the deep role that religion plays in making
sense of personal suffering and death. For example, a Jehovah‟s Witness‟ refusal of a
blood transfusion may look like a needless death from the outside, but to the patient it is
an act of obedience to God. The patient views the benefits of the afterlife as more
desirable than the goods of this life. However, James Childress raises a relevant point:
“when a person is seriously maiming himself…forcible intervention is warranted because
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of the heavy burden and costs such injuries impose on others.”203 Childress‟ point
demonstrates that there is often more at stake than the interests of the patient. Although
we ought to respect patient autonomy, potential harm to others may be grounds to deny a
treatment request.
In some cases, patients may make decisions that ignore the interests of their
families and result in great harm financially, emotionally, or physically. This is a matter
of great concern and should be discussed with patients and family members prior to
approving any such request. Caregivers should consider the harm done to others and
whether those affected are willingly affected – they may, in fact, share the religious
belief. In addition, a patient‟s decision might harm other patients, the most obvious case
being the problem of scarce medical resources. Such concerns would likely override the
patient‟s autonomy.
The most difficult case, however, is when the religious belief is held by a parent,
and the treatment request harms a child. This is difficult because under normal
circumstances most feel that parental choices ought to be respected even when they entail
a certain amount of risk or danger for the child such as taking children skydiving.
However, when it comes to medical care, the law has tended to frown on decisions –
religiously motivated or not – that entail great risks for children. In Prince v.
Massachusetts (1944) the Supreme Court decided that individuals may be free to make
martyrs of themselves, but not of their children. I will explore this problem more deeply
later.
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In sum, a “no harm” condition is essential if for no other reasons than to reinforce
the Hippocratic Oath; this condition is defeasible such as in some cases of self-harm, but
it serves as a safeguard against runaway patient autonomy and a prevention of harm done
to others. If it can be demonstrated that minimal harm will occur and the belief satisfies
the other conditions, then the request may be granted.
The no-harm condition is tied to the virtue of compassion. Beauchamp and
Childress define the virtue as “a trait that combines an attitude of active regard for
another‟s welfare with an imaginative awareness and emotional response of deep
sympathy, tenderness, and discomfort at another‟s misfortune or suffering.”204 Both
physicians and patients should exemplify this virtue.

Conclusion
Off hand, I can think of two other criteria that might be relevant: (1) that patients
understand the medical situation and the consequences related to their requests and (2)
that patients show a willingness to reason about or discuss their beliefs with the
caregivers of whom they are making the request. I believe that the former criterion is
essential, but I have chosen not to address it here because it is a purely epistemic criterion
and it is sufficiently addressed by Adrienne M. Martin in “Tales Publicly Allowed:
Competence, Capacity, and Religious Belief.”205 The latter criterion is also an epistemic
one, but I fear that it would be too limiting, ruling out many religious believers –
individuals who are not used to defending their faith and ones who believe that reasons
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cannot be given for faith. One way to include this condition would be to make it
subjunctive: if the patient were able or willing to reason about it, could a case be made in
its favor? Whether this is a workable criterion is questionable, but even if it is, I believe
that the same concerns are addressed by the religious interpreter condition, making this
criterion redundant.
Certainly, the MVRB conditions could be further expanded, clarified, or limited; I
am sure that they are not yet complete, but my purpose here has been to simply suggest a
basic framework within which to separate medically valid religious beliefs from ones not
worthy of consideration. It is important to remember that these criteria are not “all or
nothing;” some religious beliefs might have more of one and less of another. I take this
as a merit of the approach because it does not pretend to draw an absolute line, which
separates those on the “inside” from those on the “outside.” Each request would need to
be evaluated by the criteria independently. Each condition is informed by a principle that
is widely accepted as a virtue in the intellectual or moral life. For example, the
community and deeply-held conditions are based on the intellectual virtue of autonomy
mentioned earlier.
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CHAPTER FIVE
Application of the PRB and MVRB Conditions
Jehovah‟s Witnesses give two main reasons for rejecting blood transfusions: (1)
medical risk and (2) the command of God. The Mayo Clinic website says, “Blood
transfusion is a common procedure that usually goes without complications. But there
are some risks.”206 The website lists the following risks: (1) allergic reactions, (2) fever,
(3) lung injury, (4) bloodborne infections like HIV, (5) iron overload, (6) acute immune
hemolytic reaction, (7) delayed hemolytic reaction, and (8) graft-versus-host disease.207
JW literature stresses these risks, so much so that an outsider might get the idea that this
is the only reason JWs have to reject transfusions.208
While it must be granted that blood transfusions entail some medical risk, the
amount of concern shown by JWs is not medically warranted, especially if such worries
prevent patients from ever opting for a transfusion. First, it appears to be irrational, based
on a logical error. Interpreting JW literature at face value might lead a JW to the
following (invalid) logical deduction:
(1) There is a risk of dying from a blood transfusion. (true)
(2) I will require a blood transfusion if I am to have this operation. (true)
(3) Therefore, if I have this operation, I will probably die.209
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The conclusion does not follow from the premises. Second, if medical risk is the main
concern, then it would logically follow that JWs, who say they have a high regard for life,
would sometimes accept a transfusion if the risk of rejecting it would amount to certain
death.210 But they do not do so. Therefore, it is obvious that medical risk is not playing
the role that JWs contend. At best, it is a secondary reason, so I will set it aside for the
moment. The main reason for JWs to refuse blood products is that they believe that God
prohibits transfusions. Is such a belief rational?
There is nothing inherently irrational about belief in God. In fact, much has been
written in defense of the rationality of belief in God; take, for example, the book The
Rationality of Theism by Paul Copan and Paul Moser.211 Contributors to the book
include William P. Alston, Stephen T. Davis, William Lane Craig, and Charles
Taliaferro. Copan and Moser say in the introduction that theism is experiencing a
renaissance in intellectual circles, and they refer to atheist philosopher Quentin Smith
who laments the return of religious belief:
Much to Smith‟s dismay, it became clear that “realist theists were not outmatched
by naturalists in terms of the most valued standards of analytic philosophy:
conceptual precision, rigor of argumentation, technical erudition, and an in-depth
defense of an original world-view.” All the while naturalists have “passively
watched” as the influence of theistic philosophy has soared: “perhaps one-quarter
or one-third of philosophy professors are theists, with most being orthodox
Christians.” Smith concedes: “God is not „dead‟ in academia; he returned to life
in the late 1960s and is now alive and well in his last academic stronghold,
philosophy departments.”212
Contributors to the book argue that theism offers the best answers to some of the most
difficult philosophical questions such as why something exists rather than nothing. In
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chapter six, “The Cosmological Argument,” William Lane Craig describes and defends
one argument for the existence of God called the kalam cosmological argument, which
says, (1) whatever begins to exist has a cause, (2) the universe began to exist, and
therefore, (3) the universe has a cause.213 Philosophical arguments like these demonstrate
that theism can be a rational belief.
In addition, there is nothing inherently irrational about belief in a God who gives
moral commands. The God of Christian theism has traditionally been conceived as a
morally perfect being, one who creates free creatures and desires them to flourish.
Divine moral commands are rationally conceivable as a means to the flourishing of free
creatures. While divine command theory may be out of vogue these days as a moral
philosophy among professional ethicists, it still has its defenders among analytic
philosophers.214 So, if JW beliefs are irrational, then they are irrational for some other
reason.
Is it irrational to believe that God would require his people to refuse the medical
use of blood products? To answer this question we would need to determine whether the
following JW beliefs (mentioned in chapter one) are compatible with PRB:
1. Armageddon is near, in which all mankind will be destroyed except faithful
JWs who will live forever on earth;
2. The WTS governing body is believed to be the “faithful and discreet slave”
referred to in Jesus‟ parable at Matthew 24:45, divinely appointed by Jesus
Christ to lead JWs;
3. The Bible cannot be understood without interpretation by the “faithful and
discreet slave”;
213
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4. JWs who openly criticize the leadership and the organization are regarded as
apostates, disloyal to Jesus and God;
5. Salvation is contingent on how well they perform as loyal JWs215
Some of these beliefs are based on a particular interpretation (hermeneutic) and
application of specific Bible passages. To discover whether such beliefs are compatible
with PRB, we need to ask what intellectual virtues are relevant in hermeneutics and
whether such hermeneutical virtues are compatible with the JW reading of the Bible.
Interpreting the Bible is a practice engaged in by a living tradition, a collection of
diverse but related religious communities that see the Bible as authoritative for faith and
practice. As Alasdair MacIntyre says, “A living tradition…is an historically extended,
socially embodied argument, and an argument precisely in part about the goods which
constitute that tradition…What then sustains and strengthens traditions? What weakens
and destroys them? …The answer in key part is: the exercise or the lack of exercise of the
relevant virtues.”216 As Stephen E. Fowl points out, Christians through the centuries have
shown a tendency to rationalize their own evil practices, such as slavery, by ignoring the
intellectual virtues in their hermeneutics.217 He says that a Christian theology of sin (that
human beings are fallen and prone to self-justification and rationalization – even while
reading Scripture) should inform Christian interpretive practices, encouraging Christians
to remain “vigilant over their interpretation.”218
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The virtues relevant to biblical interpretation are, at least in part, the intellectual
virtues mentioned above: the love of knowledge, firmness, courage and caution, humility,
and autonomy. If JWs cultivate the love of knowledge, then they would welcome
opportunities to test their beliefs and would not reject dialogue and debate with others in
the (Christian) tradition regarding the correct interpretation of Scripture. However, it is
unclear that this is the case. If Muramoto is correct, “Jehovah‟s Witnesses have been
strongly discouraged from discussing critical religious issues with outsiders, particularly
with former members, and can be „disfellowshiped‟ (excommunicated) for doing so.”219
It is one thing to require that members of the community adhere to community practices,
this conforms to the virtue of community integrity that is alluded to by Donald T. Ridley
in response to Muramoto: “Muramoto‟s suggestion that each individual should be free to
disregard the community‟s scriptural teachings and standards and yet remain a member of
the community is preposterous.”220 However, it is quite another thing to prohibit
members of the community from discussing or testing their beliefs with those who
believe otherwise. The practice of excommunication is, to the extent that it is not
coercive, compatible with the love of knowledge; the closed-minded practices that
Muramoto refers to is not.
Such an unwillingness to sincerely consider other interpretations is an example of
other vices as well, such as being overly cautious. Being overly cautious, in this case,
appears to be a manipulative practice based on the fear that members of the community
might come to embrace other interpretations or simply abandon ship. This separation
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from other Christians is also an example of the vice of arrogance. Insofar as The
Watchtower enjoins its members not to listen to others, it is commanding them to act in
an arrogant manner. Intellectual humility would require JWs to recognize that only God
has a monopoly on knowledge and much can be learned in discussion with others,
especially with those who disagree with you. In addition, this separation from others
appears to be an example of the vice of improper hetero-regulation, which occurs in this
case because The Watchtower does not cultivate the virtue of intellectual autonomy, or
the ability of its members to think for themselves.
MacIntyre adds to these virtues an additional one: “the virtue of having an
adequate sense of the traditions to which one belongs or which confront one.”221 It is
unclear whether JWs have an adequate sense of their tradition, especially in light of the
beliefs above, in which JWs view themselves as the only beneficiary of God‟s
enlightening and saving grace. Instead, JWs need to view themselves as belonging to a
larger tradition of religious groups who hold the Bible to be authoritative.
The JW rejection of blood is based on its unique interpretation and application of
particular scriptural passages, as seen in chapter one. The Watchtower asserts that only
its interpretations of these passages, no matter how implausible, are valid because The
Watchtower is “the faithful and discreet slave” of Matthew 24:45. It is unclear how such
authority is supposed to follow logically from this passage even if the “slave” is
identified with The Watchtower. No other major Christian group stakes its claim to
ecclesiastical authority on this passage, and it seems to be quite a stretch to do so here.
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Since its claim to ecclesiastical and hermeneutical authority starts on such shaky rational
footing, any further Watchtower interpretations are suspect.
Julian Savulescu and Richard W. Momeyer argue that JW beliefs are irrational in
two ways: they are unresponsive to evidence and inconsistent.222 First, they argue that
their overly literal interpretations are not open to evidence. Such interpretations, they
claim, ignore “historical context, the diverse intentions and circumstances of Biblical
peoples and authors, oral and written traditions in the Middle East, other religious
traditions and interpretations of Biblical texts, and inconsistencies between different
canonised works.”223 This failing appears to be an authentic example of a failure to
conscientiously do one‟s research and test one‟s beliefs against other in the biblical
community.
Second, Savulescu and Momeyer argue that JWs ought to recognize that their
own beliefs are inconsistent. They explain, as an example, that the JW prohibition
against the consumption of blood is incompatible with the practice of communion, in
which followers of Jesus drink the “blood” (wine) of Jesus.224 Another example of
inconsistency, they claim, is the teachings of Saint Paul, who taught that believers are not
to be slaves to the law, but ought to live by faith.225
While Savulescu and Momeyer‟s first criticism may be valid (that JW
interpretations are unresponsive to evidence), it is not clear that their second criticism is
successful. The comparison of blood transfusion to the practice of communion may fail
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to take into account what JWs actually believe about the nature of blood consumption. If
Richard Singelenberg‟s analysis is correct, then the underlying reason for not consuming
the blood of other human beings is to avoid pollution with apostates.226 According to JW
beliefs, it is possible even for current Jehovah‟s Witnesses to apostatize, so consuming
only the blood of fellow members is no guarantee against pollution. Consuming the
blood of Jesus Christ, however, may be safe enough, given his sinless nature. In fact,
being united with Christ is a common Christian teaching; however, The Watchtower does
not teach the transubstantiation of the communion elements, i.e. the wine becoming
blood, like the Catholics. They believe, like many other Protestant denominations, that
the elements are only symbols of the body and blood of Jesus, eaten in remembrance.227
So, the comparison ultimately fails.
The second point about Paul‟s teaching is also weak. Paul, in this passage, is
warning the church in Galatia about the dangers of certain false teachers in their midst
(the so-called Judaizers), who were trying to convince the Gentile believers to be
circumcised like the Jewish believers. Paul is not teaching antinomianism here, or that all
moral rules are bad, for he prescribes other moral practices in his letters. Instead, he is
trying to combat the tendency of believers to rely on old Jewish traditions rather than
faith. Anyway, Paul himself delivered the “blood” message to the Gentile believers in
Acts about the prohibition of consuming blood, so, Savulescu and Momeyer‟s charge of
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inconsistency fails.228 Nevertheless, even if the charge of inconsistency fails, the first
charge of irrationality may stick.
However, before we decide whether to honor JW M-requests, it will be helpful to
determine whether JW M-requests satisfy the MVRB conditions: whether the M-requests
are based on religious beliefs that (1) are held by a community, (2) are deeply held, (3)
would pass the test of a religious interpreter, and (4) do no harm. The first is the
community condition. JWs number close to seven million worldwide, and while the
seven million figure does not come close to the number of followers in any of the world‟s
great religions (consider the 1.5 billion followers of Islam229), it is not a small religion by
any means. In addition, the blood mandate is widely taught and carefully adhered to.
The authority of the Watchtower on this issue extends to the JW community worldwide,
at least regarding the use of whole blood products. The Watchtower leaves the question
of the use of blood components up to local communities.
The second condition is whether the belief is deeply held. Such a condition needs
to be applied on a case by case basis – many JWs are sincerely committed to these
beliefs, but many are not. Stories abound in the medical community of patients who are
relieved to have blood transfusions forced upon them. Such patients feel coerced by their
community to refuse blood, but deep inside they want to continue living by whatever
means possible. Discerning whether coercion is playing a role is difficult, but it is a
challenge that healthcare providers must accept as part of the job, and not just with JW
patients. The difficulties of ferreting out coercion can be mitigated if the patient can be
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spoken with alone separate from other family or church members. In such a situation, the
question can be posed: “We understand what you are asking for, but we would like to
know whether you would be relieved if we took the choice out of your hands and simply
gave you the transfusion against your will.” An affirmative response to this question is
often possible because of the understanding that the Watchtower will absolve its
followers of any responsibility if the treatment is forced upon them. However, if the
Witness is deeply against being transfused, then this counts in favor of honoring the Mrequest.
The third condition is the religious interpreter test. Would the blood transfusion
refusal pass the test of a religious interpreter? It probably would. As mentioned above,
such requests are quite common and the beliefs upon which they are based are widely
held among JWs. It is also widely known and discussed among medical practitioners, so
there is no reason to believe that it would fail this condition. If anything, this M-request
represents the best example of when a clear, well-established religious teaching conflicts
with the standard of care. Religious interpreters in these cases, then, would fulfill other
roles such as mediating between hospital staff and the patient and making sure that both
parties understand one another. Even though this M-request is widely discussed among
medical practitioners, it is not always honored by medical staff. I recall a story in which
a medical resident knew that an unconscious patient was a JW, but proceeded with a
blood transfusion anyway “in the patient‟s interest” and was later reprimanded. An
interpreter who is present in the clinic could help prevent such mistakes from occurring
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and also inform the caregiver of treatment alternatives that would be compatible with the
patient‟s request.
The fourth condition is the no harm condition. Certainly, harm will occur in
many cases if a blood transfusion is refused; however, if the M-request is made by a
competent patient and it satisfies the “deeply held” condition, then it must be weighed
against the harms perceived by the patient. The patient is making a judgment between
physical and spiritual harm where the perceived eternal benefits outweigh the earthly
physical costs. When such a death occurs, it may be considered “tragic” by hospital staff,
but it probably does not, as James Childress says, inflict a high cost on them. As
mentioned in chapter four, Childress makes the point that there is more at stake than just
the interests of the patients. The interests of others related to the patient and of the
hospital staff need to be taken into consideration.230 In the balance, the interests of the
patient outweigh the interests of others here, so the M-request passes this condition.
In conclusion, JW M-requests satisfy the MVRB conditions but fail PRB. This
shows that the MVRB conditions are more liberal than PRB and would allow irrational
beliefs. This is acceptable. Until now, I have not said much about the modern emphasis
on autonomy, according to which we feel that competent adult patients should make
decisions about their own care. Competency is not the same as rationality. Adult
patients can be judged competent to make certain decisions about their healthcare while
being irrational; for example, a patient might have an aversion to taking medicine and
might prefer to seek out alternative therapies to treat her illness before filling her doctor‟s
prescription. The doctor may feel that such an action is irrational, but the patient could
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still be competent enough to make the decision. Rationality, in terms of PRB, is a higher
standard than simple competency.
On the other hand, Julian Savluescu and Richard W. Momeyer explain, “We do
not respect autonomy when we encourage people to act on irrational beliefs. Rather, such
beliefs limit a person‟s autonomy.”231 According to this perspective, an autonomous
decision is a rational decision, not merely a competent one. If this is the case, then it
seems that we must promote rationality with much more vigor. But this may be difficult
in a system that has come to view “autonomy” as making decisions about one‟s own care,
whether rational or not.
There are many theories of autonomy, but Beauchamp and Childress define
autonomy as “self-rule that is free from both controlling interference by others and from
limitations, such as inadequate understanding, that prevent meaningful choice.”232 Under
this view, a patient may not be forming beliefs in a fully virtuous manner and may lack
many moral virtues such as concern for family members; nevertheless, she may be
making the decisions herself and fully understand the consequences. As caregivers, we
might encourage her to rethink her decisions, but in the end, I believe that it is right to
respect them, which, in other words, is respect for autonomy.
To accommodate patient autonomy in this sense, then, the threshold of honoring
M-requests must be lower for competent adults. If such requests pass the MVRB
conditions, they should be honored. The more strict PRB should only be applied when
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the stakes are higher such as when the lives of children are at risk, but I will say more
about this in the next chapter.

MVRB Conditions and the Golubchuk Case
In a recent article in the Scottish Journal of Healthcare Chaplaincy, Robert
Mundle applies my MVRB conditions to the Samuel Golubchuk case.233 He raises some
serious questions, especially with the religious interpreter condition.
First, he thinks that the community condition is unhelpful. He says:
On the one hand, a leading expert in Jewish medical ethics – Rabbi Dr. Edward
Reichman – stated that the “overwhelming majority” of rabbinic authorities would
prohibit removal of Mr. Golubchuck‟s ventilator, if doing so would have led to
his death…On the other hand, Rabbi Chaim David Halevi, the late Sefardi
Orthodox Chief Rabbi of Tel Aviv, once stated that it is prohibited to prolong life
artificially when there is no longer any hope for the patient. He said that in such
cases it is not only permissible to disconnect the machine, but it is mandatory to
do so, in that ventilators can cause the soul to suffer rather than the body by
preventing it from departing and going to its rest and peace…And side-stepping
the religious debate altogether, yet another rabbi argued that the Golubchuk case
was not really a “Jewish” issue at all, but that its scope transcended religious
bounds to become a human rights issue.234
With such wide disagreement about the Golubchuk case among Orthodox Jews, Mundle
thinks that the community condition is indeterminate; moreover, Mundle thinks that
community consensus in any religion is “surely elusive if not illusory.”235 While he does
not say so explicitly, Mundle suggests that the community condition be dropped from the
set of conditions. He says that the decisive factor is “existential confession rather than
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doctrinal interpretation,” which I take to mean that what the individual patient believes is
more important than what the community teaches.
While I agree that community consensus might be elusive, I see no reason to think
that it is illusory, especially if we define “community” carefully. There are communities
within communities, for example, groups of Jews who are more conservative than others,
ones who take a more vitalist position than others. This can be seen in Mundle‟s own
words above. Communities and groups can be recognized at many levels within a
religion. Jews everywhere share some things in common, so we can identify the religion
of Judaism. But within it, there are Orthodox and Reformed Jews, and within those
divisions there are even further divisions. The community condition allows for a
plurality of views within a tradition as long as a community can be identified whether the
community is a “religion” or a “sect.” Jewish vitalism may be one view in Orthodox
Judaism and may even be in the minority (which is not apparent to me); nevertheless, it is
held by a community of believers who have a common identity and literature.
For the community condition, there is a presumption that the larger the
community, the more often its M-requests should be honored. So, the beliefs of a group
of religious separatists do not count for as much as the mainstream beliefs of one of the
larger religions. This is in keeping with the value of community-held beliefs defended
earlier.
Second, Mundle thinks that the “deeply held” condition is useful in the
Golubchuk case. He says:
While there is no doubt that the Golubchucks voiced their religious beliefs clearly
and strongly, it is unclear what emotions and dynamics might have been fuelling
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their position. From a family systems perspective, for example, the death of a
family leader can disrupt a family system and throw it into chaos. A spiritual
assessment in end-of-life cases could utilize a genogram to focus on how much a
“vitalist” position might actually be driven by fear of a father‟s death and how
that would disorient the family in its wake. Was it fear of their father‟s death that
gripped Mr. Golubchuck‟s adult children? Or denial? Or long-standing guilt? Was
it the burden of uncertainty about what to do that paralyzed their decision-making
capacity? Or was it a lack of trust in the medical team? Or was it perhaps
something else?236
Mundle thinks that the Golubchuks‟ stated religious beliefs could be masking deeper
issues, and asking whether the religious belief is deeply held will help physicians provide
better care. He also thinks that chaplains can assist the physician in this endeavor.
Third, Mundle is deeply concerned about the religious interpreter condition. In
my original paper, I nominated chaplains for the job of religious interpreter, yet Mundle
thinks that this constitutes a conflict of interest for “non-judgmental chaplains.”237 He
says, “Hospital chaplains cannot be expected to know with any real depth and accuracy
all the details of specific beliefs and practices of multiple religious traditions, and a
summary rehearsal of basic fundamental points risks stereotyping otherwise complex
belief systems.”238 Mundle thinks that a chaplain is too fallible to provide information
about what a patient believes. The religious beliefs of patients are too varied and the
systems themselves are too complicated for a chaplain to be authoritative. He says, “The
real „experts‟ after all are the patients and their families themselves.”239
Mundle also thinks that asking chaplains to offer judgments in ethically troubling
cases conflicts with their “pastoral sensibilities” and that most chaplains would be
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opposed to their involvement as “interpreters.”240 He is a chaplain by training, and he
describes the chaplain‟s role in a typical fashion:
Chaplains can help build trust between patients, families, and medical teams in
the deadlock of ethical dilemmas in ways that correspond to the main tools of
pastoral practice…For example, chaplains provide a ministry of “presence” to
patients and to families that enables them to tell their stories freely, ask all their
questions without haste and fear of judgment, and contemplate their decisions
thoroughly with an attentive and reflective listener…Instead of “religious
interpreters” chaplains can be understood more widely as “values interpreters”
who engage the treasury of images and symbols in which religious beliefs among
other values are expressed.241
Mundle argues that chaplains provide comfort and a listening ear and that they are not
trained to evaluate religious beliefs. Chaplaincy, he says, “facilitates open
communication among equal partners, while it rejects the claim of superiority assumed
by the role of the religious interpreter as evaluator and judge of religious validity for
others.”242
I understand Mundle‟s concerns. Chaplains often perceive themselves in the sole
business of providing spiritual care; in fact, they are often asked to do more than this in
the clinic, but this frustrates them. For instance, I recall a case where a chaplain was
asked by a patient‟s physician to fix a problem, to convince the family to accept the
recommended treatment. This, the chaplain explained to the physician, was not part of
his job description, but this is mistaken. The chaplain is part of a team, a team caring for
the patient. While chaplains are primarily responsible for spiritual care, such care cannot
be easily separated from patient care as a whole. In fact, spiritual care is just one
component of patient well-being, and if we are to treat the patient, and not just her
240
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disease, then we must address every component and treat her as a whole person.
Anyway, spiritual care is often affected by the other conditions; in other words, how you
care for a person spiritually will depend on what the conditions of the disease are, what
the medical treatment is, and the communication (or lack thereof) with other caregivers.
Also, medical professionals need a complete understanding of the patient to deliver
appropriate care, and this often requires communicating with a social worker,
psychologist, or chaplain. If one of these other team members is unwilling to assist,
patient care is compromised. More than likely, chaplains are willing to be a member of
the team but simply want to limit their involvement to “spiritual presence,” but this is
morally unacceptable. If any member of the patient‟s care team has information that
might improve the patient‟s well-being, it is incumbent on this team member to assist the
others even if this means stepping outside one‟s usual role. This is done for the sake of
the patient, and chaplains of all people should be able to recognize this obligation.
When chaplains resist attempts to enlist their assistance in caring for a patient (in
ways other than spiritual care), there are alternatives. First, find another chaplain, one
willing and able to participate in an ethics consultation. Second, ask the family‟s minister
if she is willing to mediate. Third, consult a professor of religious studies who is familiar
with the religion or sect. Also, the hospital could employ a patient advocate whose job
description includes familiarizing herself with the religious beliefs of those served by the
hospital.
In the Golubchuk case in particular, Orthodox Judaism is not an obscure religion,
so finding someone, a chaplain or religious studies professor, who is familiar with its
110

teachings will not be difficult. An interpreter would confirm that the Golubchuk family‟s
beliefs are in line with traditional Jewish beliefs and could help to determine whether the
family is in fact practicing members of that faith. The interpreter could also serve as
conflict mediator, which would have been useful in the Golubchuk case. In short, it is
likely that this case would pass the religious interpreter condition.
Finally, does the Golubchuk M-request pass the “no harm” condition? Mundle
thinks this condition is complicated. He says, “By continuing to treat Mr. Golubchuck
his physicians argued that they were inflicting physical harm on him, yet it also could be
argued that he did not experience any physical pain due to his minimal brain function.”243
Mundle also points out that some people would argue that the family was harming Mr.
Golubchuk because they were not allowing his soul to go free. On the other hand, some
would say that the physicians were being harmed emotionally and spiritually because of
the great toll this case was taking on them (recall that one physician resigned over it). In
spite of these conflicting considerations, it is not clear that continuing to treat Mr.
Golubchuk would result in significant harm to anyone other than Mr. Golubchuk, and
even in this instance, the harm would be mitigated by his minimal brain function. The
“harm” that the physicians experienced is most likely a wounded conscience, which can
be mitigated by allowing physicians who have strong moral qualms with a procedure to
opt out (a conscience clause).
In short, the Golubchuk M-request should be honored. The Manitoba guidelines
that were released in response to this case state that physicians have the final say whether
to continue treatment even against the desires of the family. This is unacceptable because
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it is culturally insensitive and violates Nussbaum‟s Accommodation Principle discussed
in chapter three.

Conclusion
In conclusion, I closely examined two cases. With JW M-requests, I showed that
while such a request might fail the PRB condition, it would satisfy the MVRB conditions.
Since we are dealing with competent adult JWs and given the high regard for autonomy
in the clinic, I argued that these M-requests should be honored in spite of their
irrationality. So, when adult patients make M-requests, it is enough simply to apply the
MVRB conditions. In the Golubchuk case, I did exactly that, and determined that the
requests to continue to treat Samuel should be honored.
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CHAPTER SIX
Evaluating M-Requests in Pediatrics244
In Prince v. Massachusetts (1944), the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that Sarah
Prince, a Jehovah‟s Witness, violated child labor laws. The 9-year-old child entrusted to
her care was caught distributing religious literature. The opinion of the court famously
stated: “Parents may be free to become martyrs themselves. But it does not follow they
are free, in identical circumstances, to make martyrs of their children before they have
reached the age of full and legal discretion when they can make that choice for
themselves.” The child in this case was not in physical danger; nevertheless, this case is
often cited when parents make M-requests.
In this chapter, I consider the dominant approach to handling M-requests for
children and suggest that it is too insensitive and uncritical for our modern pluralistic
society. Until now cultural and religious beliefs have been undervalued (sometimes
unintentionally) in this discussion.
In some cases, the standard of care automatically trumps M-requests; medical
professionals and courts intervene and remove children from parental custody when an
M-request will result in great risk to a child. This falls short of critical engagement
because such cases are marked by a lack of consideration of the beliefs themselves –
emphasizing only the medical risks. In such cases, caregivers operate (consciously or
unconsciously) on the assumption that the family‟s beliefs are false or irrelevant and that
a secular conception of the no-harm principle trumps all competing values.
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This is not to say that current medical practice explicitly endorses the view that
we ought to be disrespectful of other cultures; nevertheless, the dominant approach is not
sensitive enough. It is too permissive in some cases and too intolerant in others because
true respect for matters of conscience has been missing from the clinic. Healthcare needs
a new model for dealing with M-requests for children, one that takes the beliefs of
parents seriously and avoids Dacey‟s “Privacy and Liberty Fallacies.”245 I expect that as
a result of this move, some M-requests that are currently granted will be denied and some
that are currently refused will be allowed.

Julian Savulescu
In this section, I consider Julian Savulescu‟s approach to handling M-requests for
children. His conditions hold parents to a high ethical standard, but, as is common, they
undervalue cultural and religious beliefs. He suggests the following standards for
limiting the kinds of choices parents can make for their children:
1. It must be safe enough, compared to other interventions children are exposed
to.
2. The parent‟s choices must be based on a plausible conception of well-being
and a better life for the child and not on some idiosyncratic, unjustifiable
conception of the good life. In addition, the choice must be based on a good
enough expectation of realizing a good life. For this reason, while competent
adults can refuse life-saving blood transfusions for themselves, parents cannot
refuse life-saving blood transfusions for their children on any grounds.
3. It must be consistent with development of autonomy and a reasonable range
of future life plans for the child. For example, while adults may be allowed
and even have a good reason to have one of their healthy limbs amputated,
parents could never have the healthy limb of their child amputated for many
reasons, including the fact that it removes a range of possible good futures
from the child‟s grasp. Female circumcision, and the removal of an organ of
female sexual pleasure, severely constrain the range of possible good lives for
that child, stunting the possibility of full sexual satisfaction. It should not be
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permitted. Male circumcision is different precisely because the possible
consequences are more mixed and more uncertain. The reasons for accepting
male circumcision include social and cultural considerations, as well as
medical considerations such as reduced risk of disease (e.g., penile cancer)
and infection (e.g., HIV and HPV).246
These conditions are helpful for a number of reasons. First, they establish a strong
presumption in favor of protecting the lives of children. Second, they prevent religious
liberty from becoming an unqualified absolute. Savulescu‟s set of conditions hold beliefs
to a high ethical standard in order to protect the lives of children, but they suffer from a
number of problems.

Safe enough
First, it is not clear how safe is “safe enough.” It would make a big difference if
the basis of comparison includes all of the legitimate risks children are exposed to outside
the hospital, like riding in cars or on bikes.247 This would, I think, make this condition
very permissive; on the other hand, if the basis of comparison includes only the risks
entailed by other medical interventions such as blood transfusions, then the condition is
very strict. Savulescu probably means the latter.
If the basis of comparison only includes medical interventions, then this standard
seems indistinguishable from the standard of care, which would mean that any conflict
between parents and physicians ought to be resolved by ignoring the parents and their
beliefs. I find this too paternalistic because it violates The Principle of Parental
Discretion, defined as the right parents have to make decisions for their children. Allen
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E. Buchanan and Dan W. Brock describe the reasoning given for such a principle: (1)
parents do a better job in principle than anyone else; (2) parents bear the consequences of
such choices, so they should have some control over the choices; (3) parents have a right
to transmit values to their children because they need socialization and development; and
(4) the family is an important social institution that requires freedom from oversight and
control to work effectively.248 Mark Sheldon says, “More than any other institution in
society, the family…values human beings simply because they are, not because of any
use to which they can be put. And, for this reason, it is probably in a child‟s best
interest…that the family be maintained to the extent that it is…consistent with this
objective of such nurturance.”249 Parens patriae – the doctrine that the state has the
authority to intervene to protect children‟s interests – is invoked when parents fail in their
responsibilities, and this is as it should be. However, the difficulty with M-requests is in
determining when parents have failed their children, and it is not clear that an M-request
that entails more risk than other medical interventions necessarily constitutes child
neglect or abuse. Hence, to accommodate parental discretion, “safe enough” ought to be
given a more permissive interpretation.
Also, “safety” seems to mean mere physical safety to Savulescu, but this ignores
other kinds of harms that can occur, for example, psychosocial and spiritual harms.
Making children wards of the state may protect them physically but harm them in other
ways that have been overlooked. A recent example occurred when more than 460
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children were taken into state custody when Texas authorities raided the Yearning For
Zion compound on a tip that underage girls were being married off to older men.
Surprisingly, an appeals court later ruled that Texas authorities had overstepped their
bounds: “Evidence that children raised in this particular environment may some day have
their physical health and safety threatened is not evidence that the danger is imminent
enough to warrant invoking the extreme measure of immediate removal prior to full
litigation of the issue.”250 The raid in Texas led top prosecutors in other states to assure
the polygamist groups in their states that they would not be raided.251 The ruling of the
appeals court demonstrates this point: the physical safety of children is important, but it is
not the only concern.
Psychosocial safety should be a consideration in deciding M-requests because
children can suffer psychological trauma as a result of an M-request or from being taken
into state custody. Also, they can be harmed socially if the treatment results in their
being marginalized in their societies. For example, in some African societies women
who do not undergo circumcision find it very difficult to get married. Such a
consideration may not ultimately justify the practice of female circumcision, but it is
important information and should be given due weight in decision-making.
Children can also be harmed spiritually, which, for example, may occur if the
treatment that the M-request was intended to avoid is viewed as sinful by the community.
The patient and the patient‟s family might be ostracized or excommunicated, resulting in
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a fracturing of the patient‟s spiritual development. In addition, there might be eternal
consequences that cannot be undone. For example, JWs are convinced that receiving a
blood transfusion will result in divine judgment. To ignore or reject such beliefs without
first engaging them seriously is an act of disrespect for matters of conscience that is
incompatible with a liberal pluralistic society (in fact, the whole focus of the JW blood
issue to date has been on the physical risks involved).
An American Academy of Pediatrics (AAP) statement on M-requests seems to
support Savulescu‟s position:
The AAP opposes religious doctrines that advocate opposition to medical
attention for sick children. Adherence to such views precludes appropriate
assessment and intervention to protect children. The AAP believes that laws
should not encourage or tolerate parental action that prevents implementing
appropriate medical treatment, nor should laws exempt parents from criminal or
civil liability in the name of religion…The AAP considers failure to seek medical
care in such cases to be child neglect, regardless of the motivation.252
In this statement, the AAP does not distinguish between different types of harm, focusing
entirely on physical safety. In fact, the statement makes it clear that no other conceptions
of safety can compete. This is troubling, but I do not think that the AAP is being
intentionally insensitive. In fact, a recent policy by the AAP concerning female
circumcision demonstrates its cultural sensitivity. The AAP suggests that a compromise
might be reached between physicians and immigrant communities who request female
circumcision by offering a “ritual knick” instead.253 The “knick,” which has been
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accepted by some African communities already, is a symbolic practice relating to
circumcision and is less harmful (but is currently illegal in the U.S.).
In short, safety should not be analyzed solely in physical terms. Doing so
oversimplifies a complex issue, and Savulescu‟s safe enough condition needs to give
consideration to all types of harm and be more sensitive to cultural and religious beliefs.

A plausible conception of well-being
Second, the notion of a “plausible conception of well-being” is suspect.
Savulescu explains that he wants to rule out idiosyncratic beliefs, but if a particular belief
is plausible to seven million people in the world (a conservative estimate of the number
of active JWs), then it is not idiosyncratic. He rejects the JW conception of well-being,
however, when he gives the example that a parent can never refuse a child a life-saving
blood transfusion. Plausibility, to Savulescu, appears to be grounded on an objectivist
view of reasons, which he defines as the following: “Whether a person should be offered
a treatment turns on the objective values of the physical circumstances of that person‟s
situation, such as the chance of prolonging a life in which a person can carry on
worthwhile relationships with others, achieve worthwhile goals, and so on.”254 If this is
not what Savulescu means by “plausible conception of well-being,” then he should make
this clear. In the meantime, this interpretation will serve as a useful representation of a
widespread assumption. Requiring a physical-health conception of well-being as a
condition is problematic because few people would satisfy it.
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Spiritual well-being is at least as important (if not more) to religious communities
across the world. Consider, for example, the Buddha‟s teaching on the Middle Way: he
taught that the path to nirvana was not to be found in the extremes of asceticism or
earthly living; rather, it was to be found in the middle. In this way, he affirmed both
physical and spiritual well-being. In addition, traditional Christianity rejects the doctrine
of medical vitalism – that physical life is the highest good. It teaches that the physical
body has value based on the creation and resurrection of the body, but it also stresses the
importance of spiritual well-being and eternal life in heaven (I Timothy 4:8).
Even non-religious individuals want more than mere physical well-being. John
Hardwig points out that physical health and longevity are not the primary goals of most
patients. He says, “Patients usually want much, even most, of what doctors have to offer.
But they do not want all of it; they do not always even want very much of it…Indeed, in
hindsight it is easy to see that only a very odd person has better health and a longer life as
her #1 priority.”255 Individuals, as Hardwig points out, engage in all kinds of risky
behaviors on the basis of personal goals and values. For example, many individuals
choose academic careers which entail sedentary lifestyles – not the best option if physical
health and longevity are the goals. Hence, Savulescu‟s condition of plausibility should
be expanded to be more representative.
Another serious problem with Savulescu‟s condition is that he appears to define
the notion of plausibility by content; in other words, he thinks that there is a set of beliefs
that ought to be universally recognized as implausible or irrational, for example, the
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belief that God prohibits blood transfusions. If content were used to assess plausibility,
the temptation would be much greater to dismiss the beliefs of other cultures too quickly
(epistemic imperialism) before investigating how people in those cultures actually arrive
at their beliefs. Plausibility as content is not sensitive enough to the diversity of rational
beliefs across cultures. A better model would assess plausibility on the basis of
intellectual virtues because it would acknowledge that (1) there are rational people in
every culture, (2) that rationality is not defined by one‟s own culture, and (3) it is not the
case that one‟s own culture is prima facie more reasonable than others.256 Rather than
deciding that certain beliefs are irrational a priori, an intellectual virtue approach would
involve an investigation into how particular beliefs were arrived at and how the beliefs
are held. For example, what sort of evidence are they based on? What goals do the
people hold? How open-minded are they? In short, a plausibility as content approach is
too insensitive and needs to be replaced with a model that assesses plausibility (or
rationality) on the basis of intellectual virtues.

Future autonomy
Savulescu‟s third condition represents the most common concern raised against
M-requests, namely that parental choices must be consistent with the development of
autonomy and a reasonable range of future life plans for the child. The problem with Mrequests for children is that their effects may be irreversible and that it is very possible
that if the child were old enough to make her own decisions, she would reject the Mrequest and the belief system it is based on. Many think that autonomy with regards to
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matters of conscience is preeminent because such beliefs are deeply personal and we just
cannot decide such matters for others, even children. Such beliefs are too mysterious,
complex or subjective. Sheldon sums up this view:
While the state does not know truly what is in the child‟s best interest, neither
does anyone else. What the parents believe is in the child‟s best interest may be
mistaken. Given that no one knows what is in the child‟s best interest, the role of
the state is to ensure that children ultimately become adults, able to decide,
independently, what is in their own best interest. It is not even that the state
assumes that it knows it to be in the child‟s best interest to become an adult. It
may not be. It is simply that no one knows what is in the child‟s best interest, and
the responsibility of the state is to make certain that persons who make decisions
which are irrevocable do so when they are competent.257

Future autonomy is an important principle, but it is complicated because there are
competing values. Adrienne M. Martin points out that religious practices are worthy of
some respect apart from considerations of autonomy: “Surely we value such practices and
institutions, and individuals‟ participation in them, for multiple reasons unrelated to
autonomy. Religion can be a deep source of meaning in individual and community lives;
it can build and maintain communities.”258 Religious liberty is an important value worth
protecting, and doing so not only means protecting the rights of the autonomous
individual to practice religion, but also the freedom of families and communities to act on
faith, even when they impact the lives of their children in ways that would be
disagreeable to others.
Moreover, maximizing a child‟s future autonomy is not always in the child‟s
interests. For example, if a child has a gift for athletics, the parent‟s decision to enroll her
in after-school academic programs instead of athletics may preclude the child from ever
257
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becoming a world class athlete. The child‟s future autonomy is protected – she can
always pick up athletics later – but the option of being a great athlete may have been
removed.259 Parental decision-making limits options one way or another, and it would be
unfortunate if parents never nurtured their children‟s natural gifts because of concerns
about maximizing future autonomy.
Female circumcision in Africa poses another problem for Savulescu‟s notion of
autonomy. In some African cultures, as mentioned earlier, refusal to have a girl
circumcised may result in social marginalization and the limitation of social options. As
Wangila writes, “Female circumcision is viewed by most circumcising communities as an
initiation into womanhood. It ensures female fertility, provides a source of identity, and
prescribes a social status; the lack of circumcision can lead to social exclusion and
shunning.”260 Savulescu is against female circumcision because it limits sexual
autonomy and is irreversible (in some of its forms); nevertheless, his view would limit
autonomy in another sense: an uncircumcised girl‟s social opportunities are greatly
restricted. Hence, sexual autonomy and social opportunity are in conflict. Which one is
more important for young women?
In Joy‟s case, a pediatric blood transfusion case, Savulescu would stress Joy‟s
future autonomy and reasonable (physical) life plans, so he would recommend invoking
parens patriae, securing a court order (as is the case in almost every pediatric blood
transfusion case), and forcing the transfusion. Some think that at thirteen Joy might be
considered a mature minor; if so, autonomy might require that we respect Joy‟s wishes.
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Debating the mature minor issue is not within the scope of this chapter, so I will simply
stipulate that she is not a mature minor to make her case relevant to the issues being
debated here (or we might just change the case so that her age is lowered to ten to ignore
the mature minor issue).
If her caregivers invoke parens patriae and force the transfusion and she survives,
she might face possible expulsion from her community and rejection by her family,
which would drastically limit her future autonomy.261 If she does not survive, then this
situation becomes a tragedy upon tragedy because, from the perspective of the family,
Joy is physically and eternally separated now.
Some might say that since the Watchtower organization forgives involuntary
blood transfusions these worries would evaporate. In fact, for this reason, some JW
parents are reportedly relieved when they are informed that a court order will be secured,
for their children will live longer on earth and still see eternal life in heaven. Although
many Witnesses may feel this way, it is unlikely that all will, so we need to consider
those who do not. The fact that many JWs (and physicians) think that God would not
hold children responsible for a forced blood transfusion doesn‟t alone justify our ignoring
the protests of parents who disagree. Consider a similar case. I mentioned earlier that
traditional Christianity would not support the doctrine of medical vitalism, but that does
not keep some Christians from invoking their Christian beliefs in support of keeping
patients connected to life support beyond what is thought medically reasonable. The fact
that some Christians hold unorthodox beliefs does not mean their beliefs can be ignored.
They may hold these beliefs very deeply. Also, a JW recently discussed the transfusion
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issue with me, and she compared the command to avoid blood products with the
command to refrain from premarital sex. She said that JWs would be forgiven if sex
were forced upon them (rape), but that does not make the experience desirable. In the
same way, forced blood transfusions may be forgiven, but that does not solve the problem
entirely.
Joy‟s case presents a problem for views like Savulescu‟s, because without a good
reason to prefer an objectivist (non-religious) view of reasons it is not immediately
apparent whether this M-request is unreasonable.262 Sheldon says that the state‟s only
concern should be to protect a child‟s future autonomy, so all other worries and
considerations are irrelevant. It is certainly easier on caregivers to simply have one pair
of directives: the future autonomy and physical care of children. Nevertheless, such an
approach oversimplifies the issue and is incompatible with the virtue of cultural
sensitivity that we expect from modern medical professionals. If and when medical
professionals find it necessary to reject M-requests, it ought to be done only after taking a
family‟s values seriously.
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Three Pediatric Conditions
I have shown that Savulescu‟s standards suffer from a number of problems, but these
problems can be resolved by making the standards more culturally sensitive. I suggest
that his standards be reformulated in the following way:
1. Rational. Is the request based on a rational conception of well-being? Is it
possible that a rational person might hold such beliefs?
2. Safe. Is the request safe enough? Is the risk comparable to other legitimate risks
the child is exposed to outside the clinic? Here, safety is interpreted holistically:
physical, psychosocial, and spiritual.
3. Future-oriented. Does the request have the child‟s future autonomy and
development in mind? Here, autonomy must be weighed against other values such
as social opportunity.

The rationality condition can be unpacked in terms of the Principle of Rational Belief
(PRB) and an analysis of the intellectual virtues. The other two conditions simply need
to be understood in a broader and more careful way than what Savulescu argues for.
Consider these conditions applied to Joy‟s case. JWs give the following defense
for rejecting blood transfusions for their children:
Protecting children from parental abuse and neglect certainly is not objectionable
to [Witness] parents. But child-neglect laws and the Supreme Court statement
quoted above often are inappropriately applied to cases involving children of
Jehovah‟s Witnesses. Why? For one thing, Witness parents have no intention of
“martyring” their children. If they did, why would they take their children to the
hospital in the first place? On the contrary, Witness parents willingly seek
medical treatment for their children. They love their children and want them to
have good health. But they believe they have a God-given duty to choose
responsibly the kind of medical treatment that is best for their children. They want
their children‟s health problems managed without blood. Not only is such
alternative non-blood care better and safer than blood but, most important, it
keeps their children in the favor of the great Life-Giver, Jehovah God
(Watchtower tract, 1992, Safeguarding your children from misuse of blood).
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The reasons are two-fold: (1) that blood transfusions are medically risky and (2) that God
forbids it.8 Is it rational to hold these beliefs? As mentioned earlier, medical risk is at
best a secondary reason, so I will set it aside. As I concluded earlier, there is a serious
doubt about whether JW beliefs about blood are rational, so Joy‟s M-request would likely
fail the first condition. And unlike in the cases of adult M-requests, this result cannot be
ignored because the rationality condition carries much more weight in pediatric cases
because these are cases of deciding for vulnerable others.
Is Joy‟s request safe enough? To answer this question, physicians would need to
determine the risk/benefit ratio here and how risky the procedure would be if it were
attempted with non-blood products. It is possible with the continuing development of
such technologies that the risk/benefit ratio entailed in such procedures will become
comparable to the risks Joy might face in her everyday activities. If and when it does
reach that level, Joy‟s request would satisfy the safety condition. In addition, there might
be surgeons in the service area that would be willing to attempt the procedures without
blood, a technique that has become more common. Again, if the risk entailed in such a
procedure does not exceed the risk Joy would face outside the clinic, then her request
satisfies the condition.
Is Joy‟s request compatible with the development of her future autonomy? As
mentioned above, in Savulescu‟s limited sense of “future autonomy” the answer is a clear
“no” because an early death precludes any further development. However, as I
mentioned, there is more to autonomy than just the ability to make decisions in the future.
We would also need to consider how Joy‟s community would treat her after learning of
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her transfusion. Would she be ostracized or embraced? Would Joy‟s family members
disown her or continue to care for her? Given her geographic location and access to
public services, would there be other alternatives for her if she were shunned by her
family and community? Moreover, what does her community teach about her eternal
destiny? If the physicians force this treatment on her, does the community teach that God
will forgive her? Does she believe this as well?
It is impossible to say with certainty without knowing more details whether Joy‟s
M-request should be honored. Failure of the rationality condition is significant, but if the
procedure could be safely attempted, then satisfying the safety condition might outweigh
the fact that her M-request fails the rationality condition (for the sake of religious
accommodation and Joy‟s future in the community). However, it may come down to
how much risk is involved in alternate procedures. If the risk is high and it is likely that
her community will forgive her and embrace her after the fact (which is probably the
case), then the M-request should be denied.
So, it is possible that an M-request could fail the rationality condition but satisfy
the safe and future-oriented conditions. For example, female circumcision in Africa may
fail PRB. It is unlikely that a phronimos would ever believe that removal of a clitoris
would ensure a girl‟s purity or fidelity (you don‟t need a functioning clitoris to be
unfaithful). Nevertheless, virtuous parents might still choose to circumcise their
daughters due to the social opportunities or protection it would secure for the child. As
mentioned earlier, sexual autonomy is an important value, but it is not the only value. On
the other hand, it is hard to imagine how an M-request for female circumcision would
128

ever be granted outside a limited number of African communities. For example, all such
M-requests made in the U.S. should be denied (even if the patient is African) because
there are plenty of social opportunities for uncircumcised women in the larger society.
This might entail exclusion from the patient‟s family or ethnic community, but in a
diverse society like the United States, there are other options. This is not to say that such
exclusions do not represent serious harms. It is only to say that such harms are
outweighed, in this case, by other harms.

Faith Healing and Children
In the Pamela Hamilton case, there is not enough information available about the
Church of God of the Union Assembly to know whether its teachings would satisfy PRB.
On the other hand, the church appears to identify itself as a Bible believing church on its
website, and it mentions a connection with The Church of God of the Mountain
Assembly, which has as its first creedal statement: “We believe the Bible to be inspired,
the only infallible Word of God.”263 This connects them to the long tradition of biblical
interpretation mentioned in the discussion of JW beliefs in chapter five and make it
possible to evaluate their beliefs and practices in the context of this tradition. The virtues
of this hermeneutical tradition are, as mentioned above: the love of knowledge, firmness,
courage and caution, humility, and autonomy. To proceed, we would need to listen to the
parents carefully to discern whether they exemplify these virtues. We should discover
whether they have considered other biblical interpretations, whether they have truly
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considered the consequences of not seeking medical treatment, and whether they have
improperly surrendered their autonomy to the church. We should also investigate the
church itself to see whether it cultivates these virtues among its members. We should ask
whether the church suppresses dissenting views, whether it engages in dialogue with
members of other denominations who read the Bible, and whether it enjoins its followers
to think for themselves. Only after careful consideration of these questions will we be
able to discover whether their beliefs satisfy PRB.
On the other hand, the Hamilton‟s M-request appears to do quite poorly under the
other conditions. It is not very safe: Pamela will most certainly die if left untreated,
which happened anyway, some say, because Pamela‟s treatment was delayed. And the
other risks we might consider – social and spiritual – pale against this fact, especially
when considering that this case occurred in Tennessee, where there are plenty of other
Christian denominations and opportunities for community engagement. While Pamela‟s
father was a minister for the church, excommunication from the Union Assembly would
not be as disastrous for an individual living in Tennessee as it would be for a young
uncircumcised girl in Africa to be ostracized from her community, and there are no
apparent eternal consequences such as in the JW case. If left untreated, Pamela‟s safety
and future autonomy are clearly threatened, and the benefits of being treated medically
outweigh other concerns.
In addition, the size of the community matters here, which is the first of the
MVRB conditions. The Union Assembly is a relatively small community, roughly only
thirty-five churches found across seven states (as of 2012). While the fact that the M130

request was made on the basis of a belief held by the community will give the M-request
some weight, the fact that the community is small will hurt its chances. Moreover, a
religious interpreter would connect the Union Assembly with the larger community of
biblical interpretation and conclude that the church‟s beliefs are aberrant. Most churches
in the biblical tradition request both medical care and prayer. The failure to satisfy so
many conditions would result in the Hamilton‟s request being denied.
Andrew‟s case, the Christian Science case in chapter two, is very similar to the
Pamela Hamilton case in that Andrew‟s parents sought religious healing instead of
medical treatment. Christian Science teaches its followers to pursue healing through
prayer and that reality is fundamentally spiritual. As one Christian Scientist puts it: “The
reason that Christian Science treatment, or prayer, heals is that it opens human thought to
what is actually there, to God‟s infinite goodness, which includes no sickness, evil, or
fear, and to God‟s man, who is deserving of all good.”264 Are such beliefs compatible
with PRB?
Mary Baker Eddy, the founder of Christian Science, taught a kind of subjective
idealism similar to what the English philosopher George Berkeley taught. All being is
found in God‟s mind. As Philip Pecorino describes:
[God] is and encompasses all aspects of existence as he is referred to as “God is
All-in-all.” Mrs. Mary Baker Eddy…states that due to God‟s spiritual nature,
humanity…must also appropriately be spiritual and not material…The true
universe in its entirety, according to divine metaphysics, or Christian Science, is
comprised of ideas that are completely spiritual and fashioned by divine thought,
just as Berkeley espouses in his immaterialist views. Therefore, Christian
Scientists specify that we as humans are in truth spirits produced by divinity, and
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in consequence are all incarnations of God. If we ignorantly deny the truth of
God‟s spiritual existence, it is then that we will mistakenly envision the world in
the form of material…All ideas hostile to God‟s infiniteness, permanence, and
goodness, such as conceptions of death, hell, and evil, are flawed and wicked
hallucinations and are NOT real.265
Subjective idealism is not inherently irrational unless we are ready to call George
Berkeley irrational, and I see no reason to do that given his impact on the history of
philosophy. Also, Hinduism, one of the greatest religious traditions, can be interpreted as
a form of idealism,266 so I‟m inclined to think idealism as a philosophy would pass PRB.
However, Christian Science derives many of its teachings from the Bible and claims to
follow the teachings of Jesus Christ, which would connect it to the long tradition of
biblical interpretation like the Union Assembly and JWs above. Hence, we can ask of
Christian Science the same questions: does the church cultivate intellectual and
interpretive virtues? Does the church encourage its followers to think for themselves? If
the answer is no, it may fail PRB.
In addition, Andrew‟s M-request may do quite poorly under the other conditions.
By not seeking locally and easily-available medical care, Andrew‟s father needlessly put
his son‟s safety and future autonomy in jeopardy. Hickey and Lyckholm argue: “The
ethical calculus of benefit/burden is clearly in favor of benefit of medical treatment. It
would seem that medical treatment of a Christian Scientist‟s child does not impose
specific or harsh burdens on the child or the parent. Alternatively, the burdens imposed if
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the child is not treated are considerable, including severe morbidity and even
mortality.”267 Apparently, there is no banishment from the community and no permanent
eternal consequences such as what occurs when a JW requests a blood transfusion. This
balance of burdens and benefits leads us to reject the M-requests of Christian Science
parents.

Conclusion
Hickey and Lyckholm caution against overriding parental requests too quickly.
They cite Beauchamp and Childress in proposing a set of conditions for when to allow
the standard of care to override parental M-requests:
(1) Better reasons can be offered to act on the overriding norm than on the
infringed norm.
(2) The moral objective justifying the infringement has a realistic prospect of
achievement.
(3) No morally preferable alternative actions can be substituted.
(4) The form of infringement selected is the least possible commensurate with
achieving the primary goal of the action.
(5) The agent seeks to minimize the negative effects of the infringement.268
While these conditions are important and helpful, one could satisfy them without taking
the parent‟s beliefs seriously, which takes us back to the discussion of respect in chapter
three.

267
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Parents who make M-requests must be listened to and fully understood before a
decision is made, which can occur by putting the parents into dialogue with the
caregivers and asking them to explain their beliefs, if possible. However, there may be
language and cultural barriers, and the stress of the situation may prevent productive
dialogue. In such cases, it may be necessary to consult a religious interpreter – the
parents‟ own minister, a hospital chaplain, or a religious studies professor. An interpreter
should be able to open a window into the parents‟ world and explain to caregivers why
the parents hold the beliefs they do.
Taking parents‟ beliefs seriously also includes examining them under PRB. As I
have shown, M-requests for children must be held to a higher standard than M-requests
for competent adults, and I believe the conditions I suggest – (1) rational, (2) safe, and (3)
future-oriented – accomplish this.

134

CHAPTER SEVEN
Conclusion
The threshold for honoring M-requests for children must be higher than the
threshold for honoring requests made by adult patients because there is more at stake than
when competent adults make M-requests for themselves. M-requests in pediatrics must
satisfy three conditions: (1) rational, (2) safe, and (3) future-oriented, whereas M-requests
for adults only need to satisfy the MVRB conditions: the religious belief (1) is held by a
community, (2) is deeply held, (3) would pass the test of a religious interpreter, and (4)
does no harm. Applying only the MVRB conditions to adults – a lower threshold – is in
keeping with the emphasis on patient autonomy.
I have considered other approaches to dealing with M-requests but have found
each to be unsatisfactory. For example, Savulescu‟s conditions for honoring M-requests
in pediatrics are not culturally sensitive enough, and neither are Meyers‟ conditions for
honoring M-requests in proxy decision-making. The conditions I propose, however, are
based on a theory of virtue that takes religious beliefs seriously and recognizes the
existence of rational beliefs across cultures, while, at the same time, holding M-requests
to a high moral standard.
While I have only applied these conditions to a small number of cases here, they
can be applied to any M-request, no matter how unusual. This said, it may be asking too
much to require doctors to become proficient in applying the conditions. For one, it is
impossible to become a religious expert on the religious beliefs of every patient, and
there are plenty of others who can act as religious interpreters. Anyway, doctors have
plenty of responsibilities already. One solution might be for each hospital to form a
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review board (like an IRB) that carefully considers the M-requests and religious beliefs
of patients the hospital regularly serves. For example, if the hospital regularly serves
JWs, then it would be efficient to have a policy regarding JW M-requests. On the other
hand, if a JW has never been treated in their hospital, then a specific policy would be
unnecessary.
However, policy-making must be done carefully: M-requests that fail the
conditions in one area (or for one kind of patient) might be honored in another. Religious
beliefs might be rational for one religious community in one location but may be
irrational for adherents of the same religion in a different location. For example, it is
possible that a phronimos would believe the Watchtower teachings on blood products if
she lived in the South American jungle (since contact with other views – theological and
medical – might be limited), but it may be equally possible that a phronimos would not
believe such teachings if she lived in Knoxville, Tennessee. It might take more of a
head-in-the-sand attitude to sustain the belief in Knoxville than it would in the jungle.
Therefore, two JW patients, each from a different place, could be admitted – even to the
same hospital – and make similar M-requests while one request is granted and the other
denied. Also, it important to note that ruling out M-requests in advance does not commit
Savulescu‟s error of defining plausibility in terms of content because the PRB condition
employs norms of reason in its procedure. It acknowledges that phronimoi can be found
in many different cultures.
In short, this dissertation represents a new approach for dealing with M-requests
that is both culturally-sensitive and morally rigorous, and it is this balance that makes this
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approach unique. Grounded in virtue ethics, the PRB condition has the philosophical
resources to solve problems and stand up to scrutiny, and the conditions I have offered
can be easily applied in clinical case consultations.
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